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CONSIDERATION
OF THE
CLAIMS AND CONDUCT
OF
THE UNITED STATES
RESPECTING THEIR
NORTH EASTERN BOUNDARY,
AND OF THE VALUE
OF THE
BRITISH COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA.

By _____

LONDON:
JOHN HATCHARD AND SON, PICCADILLY.
1826.

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CONSIDERATION,

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THE dominions of Great Britain are so vast in extent, so divided in situation, and so various in their relations, that their general and respective interests must often distract, and sometimes perhaps escape, the attention even of the ablest and most vigilant government. The internal œconomy of a highly civilized and redundant population, and the foreign policy of war or peace in Europe, whose political questions are generally more important, and always more inviting, than those of distant and less cultivated Countries, so entirely engross the public mind, that it is not surprising, if the concerns of some remote and obscurer Provinces of the empire should sometimes meet with less consideration,

than is due, perhaps, either to the claims of that part, or the ultimate results upon the whole.

Examples of this kind are no where so frequently to be found, as in the history of our relations with America. The mistakes committed in the former management of that country, the disasters received in making war, the still greater disasters in making peace with it, may all be imputed to a false estimate, of its character and importance, its resources and increase. For a different degree of political foresight seems necessary for the old and new hemisphere, and anticipations, which would here be thought presumptuous or remote, have there proved comparatively certain and immediate, till it is now generally acknowledged, that the future destinies of our own country must, for good and evil, be principally connected with, or materially influenced by, those of America.

It is indeed an easy thing to console ourselves by turning to the unexampled successes, that have placed the Empire in the proud situation it now holds; but if we wish to consult the real power and permanence of that Empire, and not merely to flatter the nation's vanity on past achievements, it would be well perhaps to look more narrowly to that quarter, which offers least occasion for congratulation; where, however, we

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may yet profit by experience, and if we cannot remedy the consequence of former errors, at least prevent their repetition. *For Great Britain still possesses the most valuable portion of the American Continent, and does not know it : and questions are now pending between her and the United States, by which, not only may that value be greatly impaired, but the very possession eventually lost.*

There was once a time, and within the memory of the present age, when almost the whole of North America belonged to the Crown of England : in 1783, the King renounced his rights of propriety and government to a certain portion, which has since formed the United States ; but the exact limits of that portion have never yet been ascertained. By the extraordinary increase, as well of the ceded Provinces as of those retained, what was considered of little moment in 1783, has now become of vital importance. Of the differences which have arisen between the two Governments, respecting their common Boundaries, some have been arranged by discussion before Commissioners, others are ready, on our part at least, for reference to a friendly Power ; and some (the object of the present inquiry) having been referred, are directed by the umpire to be settled by negotia-

tion. The pretensions of the two Governments are widely at variance, and, on the part of the American at least, most tenaciously maintained. In the present state of the question, it can be of little use to consider the arguments, on either side, in support of those pretensions : (negotiation, particularly with America, too commonly involves the idea of compromise :) but it may tend to the right understanding of the difference, to give a short statement of its origin, before entering upon the consequences.

The Provisional Treaty of 1783, by which the independence of the thirteen revolted Colonies was acknowledged, was negotiated on their part, by the profoundest statesman that country has ever produced ; a man who, to a thorough acquaintance with the character and interests of America, united the deepest political sagacity, an impenetrable cunning, and most plausible address. It was not without reason perhaps, that he styled the statesmen of that period, as '*too ignorant to judge, and too proud to learn*;' for he was able to obtain of our Ministry terms, which exceeded the expectation of his own Countrymen, and astonished their Allies. In compliance with his suggestion, or agreeably to his wishes, the Commissioner first sent to meet him, whose knowledge and penetration might

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have proved less favourable to the objects had in view, was recalled; and another substituted, whose qualities were the most opposite and most unequal to his opponent's, and whom, of all mankind perhaps, could he have chosen, he himself would have first selected. It is interesting to learn with how little disguise or moderation the crafty American proceeded to practise on the simplicity of his English admirer. The Loyalists, who had been plundered, persecuted, exiled, ruined, were easily given up, because they had misled the Government, or the Government had misled them. Their claim for compensation was met with demands of satisfaction for the damages done by them, and by the King's troops. Rights of fishery, which the most friendly nation in Europe had never the assurance to ask, were conceded, as a boon indeed, but a most politic one, to efface the memory of the past, and ensure a sincere reconciliation for the future. Whatever could not be demanded for the right of his own nation, was claimed for the benefit of ours. It was urged, (a remarkable coincidence with the opinions of certain æconomists of the present day,) that the real interests of Great Britain would be best promoted, by the surrender to the new Republic, of Canada and Nova Scotia; and it was even suggested,

as a corollary to the same argument, that to secure her permanent prosperity, on that side of the Atlantic, it was only necessary to throw in the West Indies. The figure Mr. Oswald presents, at such a game, surrounded by the four American commissioners, Franklin, Adams, Jay, and Laurens, recalls the story lately circulating in the morning papers, of Lord Nottingham among the Sharpers, one of whom reproached his companions with wasting their time in gambling with such a *flat*, '*pick the fool's pocket at once and send him home.*' How easy had it then been for Great Britain, to have prescribed such limits as she thought fit. The Kennebec on the east; the Ohio on the west; and such a Line of boundary on the north, as should have secured to us the vast tract of vacant land between their settlements and the Lakes. They had no reason to claim, nor ability to enforce, a pretence to any thing more. Their ally, the King of France, it is now known, was well disposed, both to confine them to narrower limits, and to exclude them from the fisheries. But Mr. Oswald's mercantile ideas were alarmed with the threat, that though peace indeed might be procured on such terms, a good understanding, and above all, a renewal of commercial intercourse, could never be obtained, without more

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liberal concessions : as if either nations or individuals could long be induced to trade from any other motives, than reciprocal advantage, or any advantages were elsewhere to be found superior to the British market. Accordingly a Boundary was settled and described, by which a vast extent of territory, exceeding that of the whole revolted Colonies together, already valuable for its trade in furs, and which has since become populous and powerful, was given, as a premium to rebellion, to establish the new Republic, and furnish, as it has ever since, an important part of their financial resources, and the means of almost infinite increase. A faint attempt was indeed made, to reserve some part of the western territories, as an asylum for the exiled Loyalists ; but Dr. Franklin *did not like such neighbours*, as he haughtily says ; and Mr. Oswald thought it better to offer all, as an atonement to our enemies, than retain any, as provision for our friends. It may be that the wounded pride of the Country, or Government, found some consolation in sending a man of this description to treat with the Americans, as though the disgrace of negotiating with Rebels could be alleviated or concealed by the obscurity of the negotiator ; (or was it that an Administration, every member of which had protested in parlia-

ment that the *war was unjust*, found themselves bound to act in office, consistently with their opinions in opposition?) but such unworthy indulgence either to the contempt, or indifference, or the party-spirit, of that period, has cost much to the best interests of every other. The boundary is thus described in the second article of the treaty :

“ From the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia,
 “ viz. that Angle, which is formed by a line
 “ drawn due north from the Source of St. Croix
 “ River to the *Highlands*, along the said *High-*
 “ *lands*, which divide those Rivers that empty
 “ themselves into the *River St. Lawrence*, from
 “ those which fall into the *Atlantic Ocean*, to
 “ the north-western-most head of the Connecti-
 “ cut River; thence down along the middle of
 “ that River, to the forty-fifth degree of north
 “ latitude; from thence by a line due west in
 “ said latitude until it strikes the *River Iroquois*
 “ or *Cataraguy*; thence along the middle of said
 “ River into Lake Ontario; through the middle
 “ of said Lake until it strikes the communication
 “ by water, between that Lake and Lake Erie;
 “ thence along the middle of said communica-
 “ tion into Lake Erie; through the middle of
 “ said Lake, until it arrives at the water com-
 “ munication between that Lake and Lake

" Huron; thence along the middle of said water
 " communication into Lake Huron; thence
 " through the middle of said Lake to the water
 " communication between that Lake and Lake
 " Superior; thence through Lake Superior
 " northward to the Isles Royal and Philipeaux,
 " to the Long Lake; thence through the middle
 " of said Long Lake and the water communica-
 " tion between it and the Lake of the Woods
 " to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through
 " the said Lake to the most north-western point
 " thereof; and from thence on a due west course,
 " to the River Mississippi; thence by a line to
 " be drawn along the middle of the said River
 " Mississippi until it shall intersect the northern-
 " most part of the thirty-first degree of north
 " latitude;—South, by a line to be drawn due
 " east from the determination of the line last
 " mentioned in the latitude of thirty-one degrees
 " north of the Equator to the middle of the River
 " Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence along
 " the middle thereof to its junction with Flint
 " River; thence straight to the head of St. Mary's
 " River; and thence down along the middle of
 " of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean;
 " —East, by a line to be drawn along the middle
 " of the river St. Croix, from its mouth in the

" Bay of Fundy, to its source; and from its
 " source directly north to the aforesaid High-
 " lands, which divide the rivers which fall
 " into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall
 " into the river St. Lawrence; comprehending
 " all islands within twenty leagues of any part
 " of the shores of the United States, and lying
 " between lines to be drawn due east from the
 " points where the aforesaid boundaries between
 " Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Flo-
 " rida on the other, shall respectively touch *the*
 " *Bay of Fundy*, and *the Atlantic Ocean*, ex-
 " cepting such islands as now are, or heretofore
 " have been, within the limits of the said Pro-
 " vince of Nova Scotia."

Mr. Oswald returned to England, to weep,
 (he burst into tears), when convinced of what he
 had betrayed; and Franklin, to exult, and tell
 his English friends, *they had now nothing to do*
but send deputies to the American Congress;
 a jest, which excited but a smile in those days,
 would provoke a sneer in these, but which yet
 may have tears for posterity.

This Treaty was scarcely more injurious for its
 enormous concessions, than its uncertainty in
 defining the limits of what was still retained.
 The questions that necessarily arose were many

and difficult, and the subtilty of the American government has contrived to add others, less obvious perhaps, but more vexatious. Of these, some have been settled, greatly to the dissatisfaction of our fellow subjects in that quarter, but among those which are still undetermined, it is the NORTH-EASTERN BOUNDARY, which involves the most serious consequences, and towards which it is the object of these pages, to solicit some attention. On this side, the first difficulty was, to ascertain which River was meant by the designation of St. CROIX, and what branch of that River was its source; for our politic statesman had commenced his Boundary from a point altogether unknown, to be discovered by reference to another point equally uncertain, a River, whose mouth, and source, and name, were in dispute. By the treaty of 1794 this difference was referred to Commissioners. They disagreed. In that case, they were to nominate an umpire. A most unequal compromise was suggested and adopted. The British Commissioner was to have the nomination, but the umpire to be a Citizen of the United States. A person so chosen could hardly have been expected to decide otherwise, than that the Schoodic was the river St. Croix, and its *most eastern branch* the source; though, if the ancient boundaries of Nova Scotia de-

served any consideration, its charter had in express and very forcible terms appointed, *the most Western fountain or spring.*

The labours of this Commission extended no further than to ascertain the river St. Croix, and the point of commencement for the North line. The termination at THE HIGHLANDS, that is, the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia, remained unexplored. In this state of the question, the war of 1812 intervened; and the peace of 1815 was made, without any further settlement of the dispute, than the appointment of a second Commission; (except indeed that by inserting in the treaty the name of '*Grand Manan*,' the Americans were admitted to add a new claim, which had never before been heard or imagined, and which was so ruinous to us, and so untenable in them, that it has been happily compromised by some minor sacrifice.) These Commissioners could not agree. The Emperor of Russia, to whom, agreeably to the treaty, the question was referred, decided that the parties should arrange it by negotiation. And negotiations for that purpose, it is believed, are now pending.

The spirit and intention of the Treaty of 1783, seem clearly to have been, to establish, between the two countries in this quarter, what is termed

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an *arcifinius* BOUNDARY, such a line of separation, as should give to neither party the advantages for attack, but serve mutually for the defence of both, or especially of that, whose dominions were most likely to be invaded. Accordingly, having first recorded their regard "for the reciprocal advantages and mutual conveniences of both Nations," and their design "to settle the boundary upon such principles of liberal equity and reciprocity, that partial advantages, those seeds of discord, being excluded, such a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse between the two Countries may be established, as may promote and secure to both perpetual peace," they proceed to delineate the only Land-marks, and to lay down the only principle, which in this quarter, could answer such ends, viz. *that Chain of Highlands which should divide the heads of Rivers, whose mouths and courses were within the actual Provinces of the respective claimants.* Thus the party possessing the mouth of any stream, would possess also its whole course to the fountain head. This was obviously the most equitable adjustment, and the most natural boundary. The entire course of the Penobscot, the Kennebec, and other Rivers, flowing into the Atlantic ocean,

would be thus secured to the United States, and a reciprocal advantage afforded to us in the possession of the Chaudiere, and other streams, that discharged their waters within our territories. Between two nations no separation is so distinct, no barrier so effectual, as a mountainous frontier; and as Rivers, in new countries, are the great High-ways of nature, and almost the only means of communication and transport, any other division must give to one party a most unequal advantage for invasion in war, and to both, continual disputes in trade and navigation in time of peace. The Line of separation was therefore to be drawn "from the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia, that is, the Angle formed by a due north line drawn from the source of the St. Croix to THE HIGH LANDS, *along the said High Lands*, dividing the waters that fall into the Atlantic, from those that fall into the river St. Lawrence, to the North-western Head of the Connecticut river." Now as no part of the British possessions, in this quarter (their western boundary being the St. Croix) touched the Atlantic, nor of the American the St. Lawrence, the principle and object of the treaty evidently was, *to give them the Heads of the Rivers that*

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flowed to the Ocean into and through their Territory, and us, of those that flowed into and through ours. Indeed, the description in the treaty, coupled with this fact just stated, must be considered as quite synonymous with this interpretation.

Perhaps the fairest and most intelligible manner of stating the difference between the two Governments is this. The source of the St. Croix is ascertained: the North line surveyed: there are some where High Lands that divide the streams to the Atlantic from those to the St. Lawrence, because the Kennebec and the Chaudiere, Rivers of respectable magnitude, flow, in contrary directions, from neighbouring sources, on opposite sides of the same Heights, the latter to the St. Lawrence, the former to the ocean. So far are both parties agreed. The description of the treaty is in these points fully answered, according to the interpretation of both Countries. But the difficulty is, *that North Line, in which both parties acquiesce, does not intersect those High Lands, upon which both are agreed.* It was in this light perhaps that the question presented itself to the Russian Government, who seem to have considered this circumstance as *an omitted case*, which was most proper, (or most expedient), to be settled by

further treaty. Regarding it in the same view, a just and prudent arbitrator perhaps, who could venture to apply to a political dispute, the reasoning of private conduct, had not found it so impossible to terminate the controversy under the existing treaty and reference. ‘Gentlemen,’ he might have said, ‘the points in this question which are undenied, may lead to an easy solution of the matters in debate. Produce your North line. Place me on that point of the Boundary where you are both agreed; for example, that part of the High Lands that separates the waters of the Chaudiere from those of the Penobscot or the Kennebec; and I shall thence follow *those High Lands* down, easterly, till I meet your North line, and mark out your Boundary; taking care, if I cannot always observe the precise letter, to pursue the strict principle, of the treaty, and adhere at least to its abstract description; that is, I shall include within the United States, the Heads of all those Rivers whose courses flow through their territories to the Atlantic ocean; the rest of the country belongs still to its ancient Sovereign.’

That this is the only just basis upon which these differences could be arranged by arbitration, and the only safe and honourable one to be

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settled by treaty, may be further approved by examining the respective Lines, claimed by us, and the United States, and the probable consequences of accepting either.

In exploring this Boundary, the American Government seems to have assumed the principle, that if no such *High Lands* existed, or existed where they would not be intersected by the North line, or intersected, would not divide Rivers agreeably to the strict letter of the treaty, they were then to go up to the St. Lawrence, and fix the north-west angle of Nova Scotia on the very shore of that River. Accordingly they pass over a high and extensive range of elevated Land, which, compared with the other heights and features of the whole Tract, would readily be called and recognized as THE HIGH LANDS, but which they deny to be the HIGH LANDS *in the treaty*, because though these would indeed divide the Heads of Rivers, and give them the course and source of all that flow into and through the United States, and us of all that flow into and through our Territories, yet if the streams on this side empty into the Atlantic, those on the other do not join the St. Lawrence. They pass on, therefore, and meet the St. John's. And here it should be recalled to mind, that neither their Ministers in nego-

tiating the treaty, nor their Agents under the first Commission, had ever dreamed of extending the most extravagant of their pretensions beyond the *right bank* of this river, which they wished to be accepted as the *real St. Croix*, but which, in each instance, was resisted by us, and finally relinquished by them.* Indeed, both the language and the principle of the Treaty, are conclusive evidence, that its negotiators could never have entertained the intention, nor conceived the possibility, of touching, or intersecting this River; or else in describing a Boundary, which was evidently to pursue the great natural Land-marks of the country, they had never, not only neglected so important a feature, but adopted a principle of separating Heads of Rivers, utterly inapplicable to the Tract to be divided. Now, however, the Americans have the courage to pass the stream, and on the left bank push on their north line. Having intersected the St. John's, leaving the lower half to us, and the upper to themselves, they proceed in their course to intersect its numerous Branches, the lower parts of which are to be theirs, and the upper for us. They pass on, over a beautiful and well wooded country, of gentle hills and valleys, till, instead of

* See Appendix, No. I.

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streams running westerly to the St. John's, they meet with waters that flow easterly to the Bay of Chaleur, a branch of the Gulph of St. Lawrence. These they intersect, taking the source and upper part to themselves, and leaving the rest of their course to us. They pass on, and when a few miles more would have carried them into the Gulph, or River, of St. Lawrence, by whatever name the arm of the sea at that point is to be called, and they meet a stream flowing into it, they have the conscience to stop. And here is the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia, and if there chance to be a hill in the neighbourhood, these are the *High Lands*. Here they turn upon their heel, and follow *these High Lands* down to the south-west and south, dividing, *first*, the streams that flow into the River St. Lawrence, from those that empty into a part of the Gulph, called the bay of Chaleur, both within our Territories; *next*, the waters that flow into the River St. Lawrence, from those that flow into the St. John's, both within, or falling into, our acknowledged Territories; keeping often in sight of, and never at any great distance from, the very bank of the former stream; until, at last, to get round the sources of the Chaudiere, they must turn almost to the

south-east, and making a considerable bend, join *the High Lands* upon which both parties are agreed.

And this, they would persuade us, is the execution of that treaty, which had proposed for its object "*the reciprocal advantages and mutual conveniences of both parties*": this the Boundary it contemplated and described: which is to sever the British provinces from each other, and the Canadas from Great Britain, "*upon principles of liberal equity and reciprocity*": which has stripped us of a natural and defensible frontier, "*to exclude all partial advantages*": intersected Waters in a manner to leave no question of navigation uninvolved, that "*the seeds of discord might be removed*": and planted, in fine, the American posts and people in the rear of the St. John's, and at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, "*to promote and secure to both countries perpetual peace*"!

But, say the Americans, if your Ministers have made an absurd division, see you to that; it is enough for us that we fulfil the Treaty. Here is the boundary agreeably to its express words, and literal meaning; for the waters on the one side of these *High Lands* flow into the St. Lawrence, on the other, into the Atlantic.

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This argument is the chief foundation of their whole pretensions. It may be easily shewn to rest upon false assumptions, and fallacious reasoning. For first, a continuous *Chain of High Lands*, dividing waters in the manner they describe, or in any other similar manner, *does not exist* in the quarter and direction they would run their Boundary. On the contrary, *those High Lands* are repeatedly interrupted and intersected, by low and marshy ground, and by other High Land crossing their line, and what is conclusive, even by Rivers. *Next*, the streams on the one side do indeed flow into the St. Lawrence, (except, that at the point, where they fix the North-west Angle, that water would perhaps be rather described as a portion of the *Gulph*,) but the rivers on the other side *do not fall into the Atlantic ocean*. Ultimately, indeed, it is well known, that all rivers fall into the Ocean, of which all seas, gulphs, and bays, are in some sense a part; but in questions of geography, or hydrography, separate names are given and used for these several parts, and are applied in *contradistinction to each other*, and *to the whole*. Nor can it be said that the parties, or makers of the treaty, were ignorant of, or averse to, these distinctions, which the common sense and common usage of mankind has constantly recog-

nized, for they themselves have made use of them, and in this very Treaty, and more than once. In the sense therefore in which the treaty applies the words, these Streams do not fall into "*the Atlantic.*" They fall into the St. John's, or they fall into "*the Bay of Fundy,*" nay, they fall into "*the Gulph of St. Lawrence,*" divisions of water, to which those names are given by the Treaty, in distinction from "*the Atlantic,*" which, as it touched no part of a coast bounded by the St. Croix, so it could receive no Rivers that flowed through our Territories; and for that reason the Heads of all Rivers that reached it were assigned to the United States. In this understanding the object of the treaty, in describing the High Lands, appears obvious, its principle rational, and advantages reciprocal. If this sense be rejected, the apparent basis becomes not only inapplicable and absurd, but it is impossible to substitute any other theory for so unaccountable a Boundary, or conceive what purpose was had in view, what motive proposed, or what madness or folly possessed the negotiators, that they laid down a line, the very figure and appearance of which, on the Map, are as fantastic, as the difficulties it involves are obvious, and the consequences alarming.

Let us now examine, and compare with this,

the Boundary as claimed by the British Commissioners. It commences from the same point, and runs in the same direction North. On approaching the western Bank of the St. John's, it intersects the range of HIGH LANDS already alluded to, rising from fifteen hundred to two thousand feet above the level of the sea, and extending in unbroken ridges in a western course. Here we find that feature of the Country, that elevation of Land, which, from its height and extent, would be easily recognized, and termed, in a geographical description of the tract, "THE HIGH LANDS." Here, therefore, at Mars Hill, the name given to the height intersected, we terminate the North line, and fix the North-west Angle of Nova Scotia. Thence we follow these Heights of land, dividing the Heads of Rivers, leaving the St. John's, its source and branches, flowing to the northward and eastward into our Territories, on the right, the Penobscot, the Kennebec, and other intermediate streams, flowing south-westerly, into theirs, on the left, till we reach the fountains of the Chaudiere, where we are joined by the American Commissioners, and proceed together to the Connecticut. It is a fact of great importance, and which has been ascertained by actual survey, that the High Lands, at the point where we are joined by the

American Commissioners, and upon which both parties are agreed, are evidently the continuation of the heights from Mars Hill, and the whole together form one and the same Chain. By this Line we execute the principle of the Treaty, for we divide the Rivers, running in contrary directions into the respective territories of each, at their sources. We fulfil its object, of *equity, reciprocity, the exclusion of partial advantages, ("those seeds of discord,") and the foundation of perpetual peace*, for we establish such an *arcifinius Boundary*, as alone, without exposing their Provinces to attack, could possibly leave ours capable of defence. And, finally, we do no violence to the letter of the Treaty. For the objection to these *High Lands*, on this score, may be fairly reduced to this; the words of the treaty are, "Rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence:" there are waters, on the northern side of *these High Lands*, that flow into the river St. Lawrence; *but there are also*, that fall by the river St. John's into the Bay of Fundy. Now, if indeed we are to get over this difficulty by verbal subtility, and the most venial equivocation is to prevail, it certainly appears less sophistical in the Americans to say, the Bay of Fundy is the Atlantic Ocean, than for us to pretend that the Bay of Fundy is the

river St. Lawrence; though, to an accurate reasoner, who consulted the distinctions in the Treaty, the prevarication on both sides would appear nearly equal: but if the principle and basis of the Line be kept in view, and we endeavour to reconcile to them any seeming discrepancy in the words, may we not say to this objection, that there is nevertheless nothing in the description of this Boundary by the treaty inconsistent with the facts of the Survey, though there are indeed other and more facts in the Survey than are mentioned in the description; still if these other geographical facts are of a similar nature, and included within the same reason, (viz. Rivers flowing into and through our actual Territories,) ought they not to be intended to fall within the same division? Besides, what is it to the Americans, where the rivers north of the High Lands discharge? It is enough for them that all on the South flow immediately to the Atlantic, or at least that all which flow immediately to the Atlantic are on the South side. Those are all the Treaty conceded to them, and all, which were not conceded, belong still to their ancient Sovereign, by title paramount, wherever they discharge. It is no objection to our claim therefore, that "*the Bay of Fundy*" is not "*the St. Lawrence,*" while it is conclusive

against theirs that "*the Bay of Fundy*" is not "*the Atlantic Ocean.*" For granted, that as the Treaty gives them those Rivers only which flow into the Atlantic, so it assigns to us those only which fall into the St. Lawrence, and that the River St. John's, which empties into the Bay of Fundy, is *an omitted case*; still, to whom does it now belong? To the King, who owned and possessed it years before the Treaty? Or to the Republic, which neither owned, nor possessed, nor claimed it, till after? But the Boundary at and from the North-west Angle is marked and described by *two* facts, or circumstances, the *Elevation of land*, and the *Division of rivers*. The former, which, as it is *first*, and *separately*, mentioned in the treaty, merits perhaps at least an equal consideration, is strictly pursued by the Line we claim, for throughout the whole Survey north to the shore of the St. Lawrence, has no range of heights been intersected, more prominent in elevation, or unbroken in extent. The latter designation, the *Division of rivers*, in the strict and literal sense to which they would confine the Treaty, is found utterly inapplicable to the country intersected by the North line. Now if one part of the description be consistent, and one part at variance, with the geography of the Tract surveyed, and the part which is consistent

be a Land-mark sufficient for our direction, and the part which is at variance easily reconciled with the other, by recurring to the principle, and to what may be considered the *abstract delineation* of the Boundary, why should we not adopt so obvious a solution of the difficulty, and follow THE HIGH LANDS, and divide the waters that fall into the Atlantic from those that fall into the St. Lawrence, agreeably to the letter of the Treaty, where we can, and where we cannot, divide the waters that flow through their Territories, that is, into "*the Atlantic*," from those that flow into the St. John's, and "*Bay of Fundy*," that is, through our Territories, agreeably to the reason and basis of the division.

These considerations have not been mentioned so much with any view of setting forth the arguments, that support the claims of the British or American Governments, which are respectively assisted or impugned by many other collateral reasons, but rather to discover the aims and disposition of the United States, and introduce and explain the late extraordinary proceedings of that Republic. For such being the state of the question, and negotiations respecting this Boundary between the two Countries being now pending, and that possession and jurisdiction over the disputed Territory of

the Crown of Great Britain, which had commenced from the conquest or cession of Nova Scotia and Canada, years before the existence of an American republic, still continuing and uninterrupted, (and not merely the constructive possession of Public or Municipal law, but the actual exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction, by Grants of land, Issuing of writs, Training militia, Licences to cut timber on the vacant forest, and all other the same duties and privileges of British subjects existing there, as are known at Halifax or Quebec); it seems to have been now thought in the United States, as inconsistent with the free and independent spirit of '*the American People,*' to expect longer the result of those negotiations; and accordingly, during the last year, they resolved, "*that possessory acts on their part should be resorted to without delay.*" In compliance with their request, the King had just before discontinued and recalled his Licences, heretofore granted for cutting Timber on the vacant Forest; an act of courtesy, or concession, which, as it surprised and injured his subjects there, so it might have conciliated the Americans, but which, in the true spirit of friendship and reciprocity, was thus returned. Two of those free, sovereign, and independent Republics, which form the confederacy

of the United States, to whose general authority their obedience seems in a great measure voluntary and uncertain, the States of Massachusetts and Maine, whose territories adjoin this Boundary, agreed immediately in concurrence with each other in Resolutions to the following purport and words—

“Forthwith to take effectual measures to ascertain the extent of the depredations committed “on the lands of this Commonwealth,” (Massachusetts) “and the State of Maine, by whom “the same have been committed, and under “what Authority, if any, such depredations “have been made, and all other facts necessary “to bring the offenders to justice; also to make “and execute good and sufficient deeds, conveying to the settlers on the undivided public “lands on the St. John’s and Madawaska “Rivers in actual possession as aforesaid, their “heirs and assigns, 100 acres each of the land “by them possessed, to include their improvements on their respective lots, they paying “to the said Agents for the use of this Commonwealth five dollars each, and the expense “of surveying the same; and also to sell the “timber on such of the undivided public Lands “as lie contiguous to or near to the waters of “the river St. John’s, in all cases where

“such sale will in the opinion of the Land
 “Agents promote the interest of this Common-
 “wealth.”

In the style and language of these Resolutions, it is interesting to observe that peculiar precision and energy of expression, in which this people has made such amazing progress, since they emancipated themselves from the thralldom of English Sovereignty and English Grammar, and established the Independence of ‘the American people’ and ‘American tongue.’ ‘The depredations’ that are here mentioned are the acts of cultivation of British subjects, the King’s grantees. ‘*The Authority under which the same have been made,*’ is the King’s Representative, who fixed His Great Seal to their grants; and these are *the offenders to be brought to justice*: ‘the undivided public laws on the St. John’s and Madawaska rivers’ are the private estates of British subjects, held by such grants of the crown, of twenty or thirty years, date, in lots of 500 to 2000 acres, ‘100 of which, to include the improvements,’ (the cultivated portion,) are to be confirmed to them each ‘by good and sufficient deeds of conveyance,’ from this generous Republic: in consideration of which gracious benevolence, the said grantees are to pay a small fine of five dollars each, ‘for the use of this

Commonwealth, and the expense of surveying the same' (not the Commonwealth, it is presumed, but the estates of the colonists :) and finally, the timber which is thus to be there sold is as much parcel of the King's Demesnes as the trees in Windsor Forest, and by title older than the birth of that Government, which so modestly questions the right, and so delicately anticipates the decision. Not Captain Rock, not Stafford Sutton Cooke, ever gave notice to their tenants, with more scrupulous deference to the pretensions of an usurping Landlord; no Hue and cry in the Police Gazette ever described trespasses partaking of felony, in terms more guarded and indulgent. Considering the nature of the offence, and the character of '*the offenders*,' this moderation can only be accounted for by the habitual respect, which it is so necessary to observe in the United States, towards that description of Inhabitants called *Squatters*.

But if there was much in the words and expressions of these Resolutions that called loudly for the due acknowledgments of the British Government, care was taken that their execution should add to the obligation. The public Land-Agents of these two States are jointly commissioned, and dispatched, the following summer, (of 1825,) to enforce their rights to the Territory

in question, and reclaim the possession. With a party of men they arrive; "make domiciliary visits to many of the settlers," (the words of their own report,) "explain the object of their visit, and commence surveying the settlers' lots, of 100 acres each, to several of whom they make deeds," (for the consideration, we presume, above enjoined;) "post up notices of the disposition of the State towards the settlers at the Church and at the corn-mills," and appoint two Agents with power to grant permits for cutting timber. They speak, with praise, of the beauty and fertility of the country, and of the industry and hospitality of the Inhabitants, whom they represent to be "well deserving the fostering care of government, having grants from the Province of New Brunswick," in which "they have little confidence, and desirous of purchasing at a fair rate" a good title from their friendly visitors, who succeed in persuading some to make application to their Legislature for that purpose. This much is collected from their Report itself, and from the forwardness with which these facts are avowed, and the industry with which they are published and circulated, these Governments really appear to have been afraid lest their conduct in this respect should pass unknown or unobserved; and while we admire their fostering

attention to the king's subjects in that quarter, we cannot but wonder at the ostentation with which it is proclaimed. But from other sources it is discovered that the zeal of these Agents carried them so far, as to endeavour to persuade the Colonists no longer to muster at the Militia Trainings, which were about to take place under the King's Government of New Brunswick, offering to pay their fines, and omitting no means to seduce their affections; which seem not to have succeeded as was desired, since the Trainings were attended in the usual manner, and a company, it is said, set out in pursuit of the American emissaries, and had they been some hours later in their retreat, the Courts of Law in the Province, might have rendered those acknowledgements to the individuals employed, which their Employers can expect from the Imperial Government alone. On their return, the Report, already mentioned (*and hereto annexed**) is made by these Agents, to their respective Governments. It concludes by recommending, for the Country they have visited, "that two *Justices of the Peace be commissioned*; that *a Deputy Sheriff* or Constable be appointed; and that *one or more Military Districts be*

* Appendix, No. 3.

*“formed at Madawaska, and at a suitable time
 “ so organized that they may have a Represen-
 “ tative in the Legislature of Maine.”* Measures, which the same report assures us, have met with the entire approbation of the Executive of that Commonwealth.

Doubtless, persons were not wanting in the States, that adopted those Resolutions, (for there are in that country men of justice and honour, in all the offices of public, and private life, but who, from the nature of their Constitution, have too little influence upon the measures of the Government), who, we may believe, failed not to protest against so bold a defiance of national Law, and demonstrate the danger and impolicy of such an attempt: that by the clearest principle of natural equity, and the acknowledged usage of civilized Nations, the party in possession could never be disturbed before the decision of the controversy: that the idea of strengthening their claim by possessory acts at this hour was absurd in the extreme: that the endeavour either to steal possession, or usurp it by force, was an insult no Nation could be so weak as to dissemble, or so spiritless as to endure; still less that Power, which had often commenced hostilities for slighter provocation and less worthy cause; which, when formerly the Spaniards seized

the disputed Territory of Nootka Sound, a desolate, useless possession, on the other side of the Globe, flew instantly to arms; and which here, within our own memory, when France seemed to be encroaching, in fifty-five, from the frontiers of Canada, thought it not too much to light up war in the four quarters of the world, to vindicate her honour, and avenge her subjects. Do not imagine that such a Power is to be thus footed, like a stranger cur, from their possession, but expect rather the revival of that national policy, which their Indian Allies would gladly hail, as *the Dog who bites before he barks*; expect the Fleet and Garrison of Halifax again at the Penobscot. And, finally, that the measure proposed was of all others the most likely to defeat the object in view. Why provoke the attention of that Government to a subject, from whose indifference to which we have every thing to hope, and nothing from intimidation? Why teach her the value of the possession by our eagerness to seize it? Or what former question, either of commercial intercourse, or territorial right, had been so compromised, that we should repent or be weary of negotiating? Since there are two ways of acquiring Territory, by force, and by treaty, let us adhere to that in which we have

been most successful ; for though, if we meet resistance, we may retrace our steps, we cannot easily allay the irritation these Resolutions must produce, or explain their offensive terms.

There were others, on the contrary, who considered this the language of the inveterate Apologists of Great Britain, and suited rather to their former dependence, or the infancy of their freedom, than its present maturity of strength and wisdom : who refused to understand how the law of nations could be more violated by possessory acts on their part, than on hers : who denied that any apprehension or argument could be derived from ancient examples of British spirit and policy, for time, while it had developed and matured the resources of America, had been adding to the burthens of England ; and however high had been her courage, and successful her dictates, to the Slaves and Despots of Asia, and of Europe, nothing had yet been seen of it, on this side of the water, that seemed equal to her power, or worthy of her fame ; whether it was that history had exaggerated the prowess of her arms, or that her spirit cowered, and her destinies declined, before the ascendancy of American valour. It was not by such temporizing policy that the Floridas had been added to the Union,

but by boldly occupying with force, what Spain delayed to concede by treaty, and doing ourselves that justice, which, if we are to wait upon the pleasure of Courts in Europe, we may for ever expect. Nor could it be answered that a different measure of respect might be found expedient for the King of Spain, and the King of Great Britain; the acquisition of Moose Island had originated in no other means than these now to be adopted; that example was sufficient to prove, either that possession was not so sacred a thing as by some is imagined, or that Great Britain was accustomed to its violation, and knew how to bear it with better temper, than her admirers have supposed. Then cease to threaten us with what is due to the dignity of her Empire, but consult rather the character of our own, and if you can remember the war of 55, do not forget that of 76, unless perhaps we defied and vanquished that kingdom fifty years ago, to tremble now at her displeasure, or be less forward to assert our right at this day, and take possession of our own. The Territory in question belongs neither to Great Britain nor to the General Government of the United States, but to the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Maine; why should we

expect the negotiation of two parties, to either of whom we deny the right?

Whatever may have been the language used, we feel assured it was on the balance of such motives and arguments, that these resolutions were approved and enforced. Upon which side the reason lay, remains to be decided by the event. Communications, it seems, have been made by the Lieutenant Governor of New Brunswick to the King's Minister at Washington, and in consequence of his remonstrance, the further execution of the measure has been for the present suspended. How soon it may be resumed, and to what extent carried, will depend upon the degree of patience with which the past shall be endured.

The Constitution of the United States, as the undoubted perfection of political economy, has many other claims to our admiration, and particularly this also, that the difficulties it presents with regard to foreign relations, however annoying to other Powers, are extremely convenient for themselves. A Treaty ratified by their Executive may, it seems, be rejected by the Senate; accepted by the Senate, the Representatives in Congress may refuse laws necessary for its execution; confirmed and sanctioned by

the Laws of Congress, the obedience of the several States is voluntary and uncertain, for the authority of the Federal Government appears to be sometimes unsettled and disputed in theory, and, in fact, always destitute of compulsory force. In the present instance also they can hardly fail to have recourse to such expedients. The General Government will probably disavow the measure, and deny the power of the two Commonwealths to usurp this Territory; the two Commonwealths will deny the power of the General Government to concede it. In either case Great Britain feels the inconvenience, and the United States the advantage. The House of Representatives in Congress, and still more the *State Legislatures*, are mostly composed of men, who seem to entertain no very accurate, or very scrupulous, ideas on the Law of Nations. The Puritans of the North find nothing about it in their Bibles, and the Free-thinkers of the South would not regard it if they did.

Certainly a more barefaced aggression, so solemnly resolved, so boldly executed, and so openly proclaimed, has been seldom suffered, or suffered with impunity, between two Nations. Not that the United States have never before sent emissaries to seduce the subjects, or usurp

the dominions of a friendly Power, but always with some pretexts to excuse, or in a manner to palliate the intrusion, or, at least, with secrecy to conceal it. But here no circumstance of injustice and contumely appears to be wanting. A People, with whom we are on terms of the most confident amity, with whom the King has been long endeavouring to settle, by reference and negotiation, questions of Boundary, and every other difference, are not afraid, nor ashamed, by the deliberate acts of two of their Legislatures, to declare an extensive Territory, (of which, to say nothing of the right, we are in possession, a possession too, older than their existence), to be their own public undivided Lands; to affect to consider and treat its Inhabitants and Authorities as trespassers and criminals; order them to be dispossessed, and brought to justice; send thither their public Agents to cut and seize the King's Timber, to resume and sell the land he had granted, intrigue with and seduce his subjects, supersede his Government, establish the civil jurisdiction and military organization of their Republic; and, in short, completely transfer to themselves, without further ceremony, the full sovereignty and propriety of the whole Country. The attention of the Public in England is so constantly engaged

by objects of more immediate, or more alluring interest, that it can hardly for a moment be directed to a matter so remote and so imperfectly understood; but in that quarter of the Empire, this event has been beheld with astonishment and indignation by all classes of the King's Subjects. In the most solemn manner their situation and constitution admit, they have hastened to send home their humble Representation,* of the injury done and threatened, to their properties, and their Sovereign's rights, and lay at the foot of the Throne, their earnest prayers for protection; and are now looking with anxious eyes to the conduct of the Imperial Government, to learn whether they will still suffer their facility or indifference to be cajoled by the fair professions of that Republic, or will, at last, be awakened to its real character of turbulence and aggression, and convinced of the necessity of never yielding an inch to a Nation, whose demands rise upon every concession, and whose strength is increasing with every demand. For it is indeed a melancholy thing, particularly for British Subjects in those Colonies, to see Great Britain, their Mother Country, that once possessed the whole Continent of North Ame-

* *Appendix, No. 4.*

rica, driven in this manner, from the Kennebec to the Penobscot, from the Penobscot to the St. Croix, from the St. Croix to the St. John's, and now, finally, from the St. John's up to the very verge and shore of the St. Lawrence, not by conquest or the decline of her power and Empire, but through the mere address and cunning of a People, who seem ashamed of no means in advancing a pretext, and regard neither the rights, nor the common courtesies of Nations, in asserting their claims. Still more humiliating must it be, if Great Britain has now to endure from that Republic, on the eastern extremity of their dominions, the same violation of Territory, which they inflicted with so much insult and triumph, on the King of Spain, in the South. "*The Americans have no conscience, Father,*" said the Indian Chief, in his *talk* to Sir George Provost, "*they have no heart; they will drive us beyond the setting Sun:*"—and *they will push you into the Sea*, he might have added; for unless a stand be now made to prevent it, they eventually will.

The decision of the present question may be found to involve no less a consequence. For there appear to be four principal objects to be secured, or compromised, by the settlement of this Boundary.

First. A Tract of Land, highly valuable for its extent, quality, and situation. It comprises upwards of 10,000 square miles; is covered with a thick and lofty growth of the finest timber; (the native beauty of the Country has not escaped the observation and praise of the American Agents); it is watered by frequent lakes and rivers, the St. John's, and its numerous branches, communicating with the sea, by safe and uninterrupted navigation, (with the single exception of the Grand Falls, which may be easily overcome,) and flowing into and through our actual Territories, of which they are naturally, and almost necessarily, a portion. This Tract is at present very partially cultivated, and thinly peopled: but the pretensions of the United States once removed, it would immediately be occupied. No part of our foreign Possessions offers more encouragement to the emigrant than this district, and if Government will at last be ever persuaded to take up and conduct the business of Emigration, in a manner worthy its results to the Empire and mankind, there is no place where it should sooner be our care to establish a body of loyal and industrious Settlers, who, ceasing to be a burthen here, would there add strength to our dominions, and in a very critical point.

Secondly. An object of higher importance is *a defensible line of Frontier*. To establish an *arcifinius* Boundary between the two Countries in this quarter, was as clearly the intention of the Treaty, as it is indispensably necessary for our security. If the present claims of the United States are conceded, and they pass the River St. John's, or even if they reach and possess its western Bank, the whole Province of New Brunswick lies at their mercy. Occupying the upper part of such a stream, the country below could never be protected, from contraband trade, in time of peace, nor from invasion in time of war. All the difficulties of preparation and transport, for attack, will then be overcome with security within their own Territory, and their descent into ours will only offer increased facilities in proportion as they advance. The only Line of division, which can distinctly separate the two Countries, and secure the weaker, as in this quarter Great Britain must be considered to be, against the aggression of the other, is to divide the Heads of Rivers, agreeably to the principle of the Treaty, by the High Lands from Mars Hill. Indeed, it is not too much to affirm, that this is the only practicable Frontier, which the relations of the two Powers, and the geography of the Country, can admit. The

Boundary must be either Mars Hill, or the Isthmus of Cumberland, or the Penobscot. A meridian Line over such an extent of territory, intersecting Rivers in such a manner, can never exist. A division, full of inconvenience for two Parishes, and almost impracticable for Counties in the same Kingdom, can hardly answer between two Nations. Between two Nations, having a common language, opposite maxims of government, incessant intercourse, conflicting interests, and a mutual and undisguised jealousy and rivalry of each other, such a Frontier can only produce continued collision and endless disputes, and must sooner or later end in a struggle, which, if there be no other recourse, Great Britain had better anticipate than defer.

It will be in vain that the possession of Grand Manan has confirmed to us the controul of the Bay of Fundy, or that by again seizing the mouth of the Penobscot, that controul may be secured, and extended along the adjacent American Coasts, if the United States are thus to acquire in our rear the command of a River, which flows through the midst of New Brunswick, and whose various branches communicate by an easy navigation, with almost every quarter of the Province. The immediate consequence to

be apprehended, must be, the case of a rupture with that Power, the attack and conquest of this Colony, and it may not be without use to anticipate the remoter, but no less important, and no less probable, consequences. The neighbouring Province of Nova Scotia becomes exposed at almost every point to attack from the mouth of the same Stream. The St. John's, by one of the greatest curiosities of nature, presents difficulties at its entrance, which might be easily so strengthened, that no force from Sea could penetrate it. Here then the enemy would have every convenience and security for preparing their Flotilla, and would expect in safety their opportunity for crossing, by a few hours course, to the opposite shore. Nor could any naval superiority prevent the occurrence, or repair the effects, of such opportunities. The nature of the Bay of Fundy renders the assistance of ships of war uncertain in summer, and in winter their very presence impracticable. Thus the natural defences of the Isthmus of Cumberland would be turned, taken in the rear, or become useless, and instead of a long, difficult, and circuitous march to the strongest, and perhaps an impregnable, entrance of that Province, the enemy gain the choice, and access, of the weakest, and in five days, an

American army from the mouth of the St. John's, might be cannonading the forts and ships of Halifax Harbour. But it is hardly necessary to inquire how long Nova Scotia could be retained, were New Brunswick lost, or how long Halifax or any other Place defended, were Nova Scotia overrun, or how the American Coast could be blockaded, or even a superior Fleet maintained in those waters, with no Harbour for shelter, or repair, to the northward of Bermuda, and westward of Ireland; (though perhaps one might reasonably extend the consideration of these consequences so far, as to question the safety of our West India commerce, or even the possession of those Islands, and still more the security of Newfoundland, and the Fishery on its banks): it is sufficient, that, without any pretension to military science, it must be obvious to any one, who either has any acquaintance with the country, or even considers its situation on the Map, that the acquisition of such an advantage by an enemy, and its loss on our part, must greatly increase their chances of conquest, and the cost and difficulty of our defence.

3rd. The third consequence involved in the settlement of this Boundary, is the Connexion together of the British Colonies, and their Com-

munication with each other. That Wedge of territory, which the United States are endeavouring to drive up between Canada and New Brunswick, will most effectually separate the upper and lower Divisions of our possessions in America, and expose the Frontier of the former Province, no less, than it commands the occupation of the latter. A long and narrow strip of land, scarce thirteen miles in width, along the shore, at the entrance of the St. Lawrence, (which is all they would here leave us, in this quarter, on the right bank,) cannot be considered a very tenable possession. The navigation of the river becomes endangered, and the very passage of the Mails extremely circuitous, and extremely precarious. The situation of New Brunswick renders it the centre of our Empire on that Continent, and the Territory in question is the very point of union; and as a prudent Commander would reserve his chief force and vigilance, for the protection of that position which secures the connexion and support of each extreme, no less anxiety should be shewn by a wary Government, along the Line of its dominions, more especially if so critical a part has already attracted the desires, and even the attempts, of our Adversary. In a commercial as

well as political view, this Connexion has now become of consequence, and the course of future events may prove it far more important. For if the Union of all those Colonies under one General Government, as is sometimes suggested, should ever take place; or if, by any unforeseen exigency, the ties between them and the Mother Country should ever become less intimate, or less effectual, such a Communication and Connexion would become to them an important bond of Union, and would create and secure a community of feeling and interest, and prevent their falling separately into the hands of that neighbouring Republic, whose power and commerce already threaten to rival Great Britain, and to whose increase, except in the present instance, we do not know what other opportunity will be ever found to prescribe a limit.

4th. But if these considerations appear of remoter interest, there are others more immediate, and perhaps more important. For it is not merely the communication between the Colonies themselves that is at stake, but the communication, between the *Canadas* and the Sea, between the *Canadas* and *Great Britain*. During eight months of the year, from the first of September to May, not even an answer from

England to any intelligence from Quebec, can be there received, except through the United States, or through the Province of New Brunswick. Supposing the latter communication interrupted, (as it will be most effectually, if any other Boundary is accepted, but that claimed by His Majesty's Commissioners,) it may easily be conceived what advantages an enemy in that country would possess, who should commence hostilities a little before that period, in the month of August or July, and thus have nearly a twelve-month to overrun those Colonies, before they could receive the assistance of a single man, or a single musquet, from the Mother Country; whose armament, on arriving, the next June, might possibly find the enemy encamped on the Heights of Abram, or their very flag on the Walls of Quebec. Or if the Nation, with whom we have to contend, were such, as would probably overlook this advantage, still should any disaster occur in the course of the war, how injurious must be so long a delay, and how frequently must succour arrive too late. In short, is it possible for Great Britain to retain and defend a country, from which she would not only be so perfectly severed, by distance and climate, but of the very occurrences in which she must

remain in utter ignorance, during the greater part of the year.

It is not merely a Route to convey the Mails that is wanted, (which the Americans would very speciously offer, by a proposed exchange of territory, leaving us the left side of the Madawaska, for an equivalent on the right of the St. John's, and which even then would continue at their mercy,) but a Military Line of communication, the means of transporting troops and stores, from St. John's, or Halifax, to Quebec, with convenience and security. The advantages of this Line have been already in some measure perceived. During the late War, regiments were marched through, and sailors transported, in the depth of winter, with perfect safety, to the Upper Provinces, where their arrival was very seasonable: and similar, and far more extensive, services, cannot fail to be received, or regretted, in case of future conflict. Such is the importance of preserving this communication, that the present question of Boundary can hardly be considered in any other light, than as involving the question of the expediency, of retaining, or relinquishing, the whole of the British Colonies in North America.

It would really appear to be faintly perceived, or seldom considered, among us, how formidable

a rival we must one day have to contend with in the United States, how rapidly that day is approaching, and how momentous must be the issue. At so great a distance, and comparatively of minor interest, little is here observed of the intriguing, ambitious, and imperious character, of a People and Government, who consider every thing they can claim and reach, as already their own, and every thing they cannot, as an injury to be borne only till they have acquired further strength. In the very terms of a previous concession they can find subject for fresh demands. With reciprocity for ever in their mouths, they can induce us to relax our system of Navigation, and yield them commercial advantages, which they then refuse or delay to return, and seem to think conduct, which in private life would be thought little consistent with good faith, to be the proof of policy on their part, or of weakness upon ours. Yet to whatever subtilty they may descend on some occasions, the boldness of their measures on others, bears no proportion to the imbecility of their present power, but seems to assume all the importance of their future expectations; and as if the vast Countries of the West were now too little for their increase, or were already but the means of acquiring more, we see them grasping, with one

hand, the shores of the Gulph of Mexico, and reaching, with the other, at the Gulph of St. Lawrence; fortifying the mouth of the Columbia, on that side the Globe, intriguing and threatening for a Port in the Mediterranean, upon this; at one time, forbidding any Nation to colonize the coasts of the Pacific, and dictating, at another, to the new Republics of the South, not to touch the Havannah; and now, at last, publicly proclaiming, by the Message of their President, that their former submission to Belligerent rights can only be remembered with the resolution of never enduring it again. (What is this but to say, that if any Nation ~~will~~ go to war with Great Britain, they stand ready to join them?) Their attempt to seize, their unwillingness to relinquish, their very demand of, the Territory in question, is a striking indication of their present aims, and future measures. For why do they thus covet the possession of so angular and insulated a tract, as if they had not already more vacant land than they can people for centuries? Why, but for the injury, and insult, it must inflict upon Great Britain? For surely the injury to the security of the Empire will not be greater, than the insult upon its policy, if they have any argument, by which we can be persuaded, that the

North-west Angle of Nova Scotia, which France once had at the source of the Kennebec, England at the Penobscot, and the Americans themselves, in 83, agreed with on the south of the St. John's, is, in point of fact, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The secret is, that the United States have long found the British American Provinces to lie heavily on their flank and rear, and overhang and command their coast. To throw off so effectual a curb, and still more, by the acquisition of these possessions, to rid themselves of the superiority, or even of the presence, of the British fleets, in those waters ; to get at their mines, to monopolize the fish and timber of America, force themselves into the West Indies, and force Great Britain out ; these have been their constant objects, since their first struggle for independence, to the present hour. Their efforts have as yet been unavailing ; nor have they for the future, by arms at least, any prospect of better success. In a few years, these Colonies will not contain less than two millions of inhabitants, who, in such a country as America, are not to be conquered : and in the mean time, experience has shewn, that with the protection of Great Britain, they may be defended ; except indeed their natural Barriers are conceded by negotia-

tion, and their connexion, and communication, with each other, separated, and lost.

The future destinies of the British Colonies in America, as far as from situation and circumstances can be probably conjectured, seem to promise a permanent continuance of their Connexion with the Mother Country. Or even if at any distant period that Connexion may be variously modified, according to the changes of time and events, yet, under the names of dependence, protection, or alliance, it can hardly fail to be almost equally intimate, and mutually advantageous. The commerce, the wants, the situation and fears, and above all, the moral feelings, of the Inhabitants, afford the surest earnest of this expectation. The liberal and parental policy of the Mother Country, particularly of late years, has added the ties of interest to those of affection, and left them nothing to gain, by any change that could be offered. Least of all can any desire, either exist at present, or arise hereafter, to exchange their dependence on Great Britain, for dependence on the American Congress, and submit their commerce to be taxed, and regulated, by the slave-holders of the South, or Planters beyond the Alleghanies, who have never seen the Sea. There does not exist among them, either in name or thought, such a thing as a

Party, or even a feeling, in favour of the United States. The avowal of such a sentiment, or the suspicion of entertaining it, would immediately destroy a man's place and character in society. Their warm and frequent expressions of attachment to England, and aversion to American principles, would surprise a stranger, and seem perhaps unnecessary to a Philosopher. We do not allude either to the antipathy of the Canadian, or the fanaticism of the Loyalist, or the longing of the Emigrant for his native home; but to that rational preference of men of sense and education, who having a near and constant opportunity of comparing a mixed Government with a pure Democracy, see little reason to prefer the latter; and if the King's prerogative appear to be sometimes exercised with less justice or judgment, know how to distinguish between the principle and the abuse, and derive abundant consolation in finding the Democracy of their neighbours, more capricious in the favour she bestows, more servile in the homage she exacts, more unreasonable in preferment, more oppressive in displeasure, and absolute in all. Nor should the disputes which sometimes arise with the Colonial Assemblies, be considered as at all involving the question of loyalty or disaffection, but as the natural results

of a Legislature, composed of several orders, or of persons representing their powers, whose constitution has not yet become settled by precedent and usage, and to which the practice of the Mother Country is not always analogous, or the analogy not always conclusive. If however, in process of time hereafter, as they increase in wealth and population, the consciousness of importance should, as is wont, give rise to feelings of a more national description, Great Britain will probably see it for her interest, to anticipate and direct these, to a separate confederacy among themselves, rather than suffer them to swell the overgrown Empire of their neighbours. Of the present policy of friendly relations with the United States, there cannot exist a doubt, nor a wish for their interruption. But the best pledge for their continuance perhaps, is to hold in our hands the means of blockading and attacking their whole Coast, which is secured by the Ports of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and an inroad into the heart of their Country, which is offered by Lake Champlain, and Lower Canada, and the annoyance of its rear, by the Upper Province, and Lakes. These Colonies, though they may have been one of the secret objects, have never been the only causes, of war with the Americans, nor have they been ever even men-

tioned, among its avowed pretexts. If indeed, by the price of their relinquishment, perpetual amity could be purchased with the United States, the present question of Boundary might with more safety be neglected : but if the estimate of relative strength and security is often the real inducement to hostilities, and if commercial jealousies, which are not yet removed, and the old dispute of neutral rights, which may at any time revive, have already furnished the pretext ; the question is never likely to arise, whether we shall go to war for the sake of these Colonies, but whether it is better to fight the Americans, with, if we must not say the assistance, yet at least with the opportunities and advantages, which these Provinces afford, or without them.

Of all the North American Colonies, the youngest, but the most fortunate in natural advantages, and perhaps the most rapid in increase, is New Brunswick, whose interests are more immediately concerned in the present question of the Boundary Line. With the Gulph of St. Lawrence on the one hand, and the Bay of Fundy on the other, this Colony possesses a valuable fishery on her own shores, and lies not far from those of Newfoundland and Labrador. Its coasts are indented with numerous bays and harbours, and the whole country is intersected

with large Rivers and Lakes, and numerous smaller Streams, to such a degree, that there is, it is said, no point in the Province eight miles distance from navigable water. In fertility of soil it yields to no part of America; the climate is severe but healthy; the face of the country level, and covered with apparently inexhaustible Forests of large and lofty timber; beneath, are Mines of coal, lime, gypsum, and others, the source of some present, and the promise of much future, advantage. Forty-three years ago this country was one vast wilderness; uninhabited, except by a few families of Acadian French, and the thin and wandering tribes of native Savages. At present, it contains and supports 80,000 inhabitants; its exports exceed the value of £600,000, which are almost all exchanged for British manufactures; and what is of far more importance, give employment to above 200,000 tons of British shipping, and 10,000 seamen. A progress so rapid, which has perhaps never been surpassed in America, says much for the natural advantages of the Country, the enterprise and industry of the inhabitants, and the value of such a possession.

But there are politicians, for whom, neither the welfare of these Colonies has any interest,

nor the loss any alarm. Who, forgetting by what means, or under what circumstances, the present power of their Country has accrued, and preferring to the lessons of successful experience, the experiment of theories, which however specious in principle, may prove inapplicable to our condition, or produce unexpected results, would persuade us, that these Countries are an unprofitable burthen, that our naval superiority might be preserved without Seamen, or Seamen supplied without Commerce, or Commerce secured without Colonies: and have published a defiance to shew what one advantage the North American Provinces have ever rendered to the Parent State. And were they so utterly useless and burthensome, as is asserted, one would still perhaps be rather inclined, in this instance, to approve the example of that old English Gentleman, who wishing to reduce the expenditure of his household, when his Steward presented him separate lists of his dependants, distinguishing the useful from the superfluous, said, upon reflection, he would retain them all, “ *Those*, for I have need of them, “ and *these*, for they have need of me.” For these Colonies, we think, were not planted and maintained, upon merely a mercantile specu-

lation, but a more generous motive, to do good to mankind, 'to replenish the earth and subdue it,' and still more, to fulfil that higher obligation of every Government, to provide and secure the welfare and happiness of all its subjects, and to 'multiply and increase them.' For however early or late may have been the period, and far or near the seat, of their emigration, they are nevertheless our fellow Subjects, members of the same community, and as they have never failed in any duty of allegiance, they have not forfeited any rights to protection. It may be said, indeed, that this cannot apply to the whole population of those Provinces, and it is true that their inhabitants are of two descriptions, and that nearly an equal portion are descendants of France. But so covetous were we once of their Territory, that we forcibly separated them from their own Country, we adopted them into our common family, and having imparted to them the privileges, have ever received from them the loyalty and support of British Subjects. However agreeable to our future interest, it would at least be little consistent with our former policy, to cast them off now; it would reflect no honour upon the constancy of the Nation; more especially as that cannot be done, without betraying

also another description of settlers, whom perhaps it would be almost a shame to abandon. For formerly, when the injustice, or impolicy, of the Imperial Government, had excited a rebellion in the old Colonies of America, there were certain of the Inhabitants, and if inferior in number, they comprised a fair proportion of the wealth, talent, and character, of the whole, who either agreeing with the measures of Administration, or thinking that no oppression, or none yet experienced, could justify an insurrection, continued firm and zealous in loyalty to their Sovereign, and attachment to their Mother Country, and exposed themselves to proscription, exile, and death, in her defence; and when the King became unable, or the Kingdom unwilling, to protect them in their own Land, with a singular spirit of fidelity, as if they had transferred to politics, that obstinacy and enthusiasm, which in religion had led their Forefathers to exchange their native soil for a distant wilderness, again came out and abandoned the seats of their birth and hopes; and, as no other asylum could be afforded, they removed, with desperate hearts, and ruined fortunes, covered with defeat and insult from their enemies, and regarded too much as a burthen by their friends,

and took refuge in these Colonies of Nova Scotia and Canada. Such were the Refugees, or American Loyalists; an unfortunate race of men! for the cause, in which they had staked all, was unsuccessful; and they exchanged home for exile, the comforts of a cultivated country for the inconveniencies of a wild and inclement forest, literally beginning, not life alone, but the world, anew; and such has since been the change in the opinions of mankind, that the principles, to which they offered so rare an example of devotion, have become irrational, or inglorious, and their descendants must scarcely know, when in England at least, whether to avow their conduct as an honour, or excuse it as delusion. And yet, so far were they from being ashamed of their own fortune, or envying that of their Neighbours, (though they had sometimes seen that preference shewn to the new Republic, which, could loyalty merit commercial advantages, seemed rather due to our own Colonists), that lately when an opportunity was offered for repentance, and the Mother Country was almost sinking in the struggle with Europe, and the United States would gladly have communicated, and proffered, and endeavoured to force on them the privileges of Independence, there appeared no symptoms of diminished affection, but

those who were attacked, armed and fought, and all were alike zealous and ready, had they proved less able to defend, again to abandon, their properties, and a second time seek an asylum in some country, if any could be found, within the protection of Great Britain, or beyond the reach of the Americans, where the latter would cease to covet, and the former to despise, their possessions.

It cannot appear a very gracious, or even a very reasonable thing, to complain of the incumbrance of such a portion of our subjects, and demand of them, so soon, an account of the expenditure and advantages, they have occasioned to the Empire. For had the reciprocal duties of allegiance and protection been as diligently performed on our part as on theirs, they had never been a burthen to the revenue. (But to insinuate an opinion of their disaffection, and talk of the probability of their union with the American Republic, must appear, to them at least, a conjecture of little reason, or a suspicion they have not deserved. If such an account however is now to be rendered, it may perhaps be found on a fair consideration of their means and resources, not so utterly deficient, as is asserted, either in political or commercial advantages. For

For they certainly have retained and added to the Empire, 1,200,000 subjects, and 150,000 fighting men, who are posted in that quarter, in which we have most to apprehend, and stand in most need of support. They occupy, and preserve to us, a Country, of such extent and situation, that it is scarcely of more consequence that we should possess it, than that another should not acquire. That an insular, commercial, and manufacturing Nation, with a surplus and fast increasing population, had better remove some of the super-numeraries by emigration, than suffer them to starve at home, or subsist by crime or donatives, is a position which reason must immediately acknowledge, and which necessity seems likely to enforce. That it is better to plant the Emigrants within our Territories, and add to the power and wealth of the Common Empire, than dismiss them to a foreign State, to be numbered with our enemies, appears no less evident. Now we do not possess, nor does the world afford, another country, so near and inviting as this; so inviting, that the voluntary and unassisted emigration thither is already considerable and successful, and so near, that the political connexion must probably continue longer, and the commercial return be more profitable and immediate, than with any other Plantation. But there are other

reasons, which render this Possession highly important, if not indispensably necessary, to the power and commerce of Great Britain. It lies between us and the United States, between the United States and our Fisheries, and either in geographical position, or political results, may be found to lie between the United States and the West Indies, and we think it not absurd to add, the United States and Ireland. It makes the Atlantic a Great Lake, for the domestic commerce of the Empire, and by shutting up the farther shore, enables the King to dictate, who may sail, and who may fish, and almost, who may wash their hands in the sea; a haughty and extravagant pretension, but which was nearly exercised in the late wars, and might be again repeated to-morrow, and as it must first be disputed, and has already been challenged, on that side of the water, so it is upon that side we should be most careful to secure its continuance. Newfoundland is too near, and naturally too dependent upon the other Provinces, to follow a different destiny; and we should find some difference perhaps, between *giving* the Americans leave to take and cure fish in those waters, and *asking it of them*. A difference scarce less essential might be also felt, in the premium on West India Ships, or the value of

West India Estates, in case of war; and in case of peace, how are they, or how are we, to be supplied with wood and timber? From America or the Baltic? For if from either, who are to be the carriers? In fact, the loss of these Provinces could hardly fail to involve, or endanger, the loss of the most valuable portion, of all our Colonies, and Commerce.

But, for there are perhaps, to whom these advantages may appear of less certainty or importance, or who are unable to estimate a value, which may not be measured by a more unerring rule, the use and consequence of these Colonies, to our commerce and navigation, may be no less demonstrated by figures, and the rigid balance of pounds, shillings, and pence. Let it be remembered, however, that "planting Colonies is like the planting of trees, in which a man incurs a certain expense, and waits long for his return," and that these Plantations were principally made by persons, whose fortunes were dissipated, and industry relaxed, by the long continuance, the miserable conduct, and ruinous termination, of a civil war, and who, till within a few years, have never received any assistance from British capital, (except indeed the short and limited credit of the Merchant). And yet, though the average

of exports from Great Britain to those Provinces, upon six years, ending with 1774, previous to the war, amounted only to the scanty sum of £379,411 annually, on the like average for six years after the peace of 1783, they were raised, by the influx of the Loyalists, to £829,088. It is worthy of remark, that during this same period, our exports to the United States had decreased from £2,752,036 to £2,333,643, (on a similar average), a loss of £393,393 annually, which however was supplied, and more, by this increase of £449,677 to the Colonies. In 1799, the exports thither amounted to £1,066,396. In 1809, to £1,733,667. In 1819, to £1,970,257. And for the last year, they have reached the sum of £2,244,245. By a Table annexed, (*in the Appendix*, No. V.), the increase of our Commerce with these Provinces will be more fairly and accurately set forth. It will be seen that our exports thither, during a period of fifty years, ending in 1824, have gained an addition of *four hundred and fifty five per cent.* over and above their amount in 1774. With regard to the imports from them, it is enough to know, that all these exports are finally paid for, and though the balance against them must often have been, and still be, in arrear, yet in no quarter

of the world are the debts so secure, and the losses, of the British Merchant, so rare and inconsiderable.

But it is far less for the advantages of Commerce, than of Navigation, that Colonies are planted, and their improvement valued, and it is chiefly by considering what the possession of these Provinces has added to the mercantile Navy and Seamen, that is, to the real strength and vital interests of the Empire, that their importance can be duly understood. For from the year 1772 to the year of 1789, (upon an average and medium of the vessels cleared and entered for the three preceding years), the tonnage employed between them and Great Britain, is found to have advanced from 11,219 tons to 46,106, being an increase of 34,887 tons annually, and which more than repaired the decrease, that had reduced our annual tonnage to the United States, during the same period, from 86,745 tons to 52,595. In 1818, the amount of British tonnage in this trade, on an average of the five preceding years, had further advanced to 179,317. And for the seven years since, ending with 1825, it has amounted to the average of 340,776 tons annually, and the number of Seamen employed has been more than 15,000 men. And for the year 1825, the vessels

cleared thither amounted to 411,332 tons, about one-fourth of our whole foreign tonnage exclusive of vessels to Ireland. By a Table in the Appendix, (No. VI.), this increase is more particularly stated.

Such has been the use, and so rapid the increase of these possessions, that they need not shun comparison, in commerce or navigation, either with any other portion, or with the collective improvement, of the whole Empire; and not even the United States, loudly vaunted, and justly dreaded, as their wonderful advance has been, have added more to their intercourse with Great Britain or with the World. For, in the year 1774, the exports from Great Britain to the United States bore the proportion of 14 per cent. of those to all other Countries. The exports to the West Indies, which are justly valued as the richest possession of the Crown, were at that time $7\frac{1}{8}$ per cent. And the exports to those Colonies were but 2 per cent. In 1824, upon an average of the ten preceding years, the whole amount of our exports was 235 per cent. more than it was in 74. The exports to the United States, on the same average, have increased 245 per cent., and are now a $14\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the whole. The exports to the West Indies have increased 300 per cent., and are now a $9\frac{1}{8}$ per cent. of the

whole. And the exports to these Colonies, on the same average, have increased 455 per cent., and are now $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the whole. With reference therefore to our whole exports, the comparative increase of the proportion, which these several Countries now receive, above the proportion received in 1772, may be measured respectively by the following figures, viz. 4 for the United States, 11 for the West Indies, and 12 for the Colonies. And with reference to the amount received, the comparative increase in 1824 above 1772, is respectively as, 49 for the United States, 60 for the West Indies, and 91 for the Colonies. In 1772, the proportion of British Shipping employed between Great Britain and the now United States was $7\frac{8}{10}$ per cent. of our whole tonnage cleared annually. The proportion to the West Indies was 9 per cent.: and that to these Colonies $1\frac{3}{10}$ per cent. In the year 1824, (on an average of 10 years), the tonnage of the whole Shipping cleared is found to have increased 167 per cent. above the amount cleared in 1772. That employed to the United States has decreased $5\frac{8}{10}$ per cent., and is now $2\frac{2}{10}$ per cent. of the whole. That to the West Indies has increased 189 per cent., and it now $9\frac{7}{10}$ per cent. of the whole. And the tonnage to the Colonies has increased 2370 per cent.,

and now forms $12\frac{1}{10}$ per cent. of the whole foreign navigation of Great Britain, including the vessels cleared for Ireland. As far therefore as our Navigation is concerned, the advantage now derived to us from the United States, and the North American Colonies respectively, compared with that of the year 1772, may be represented by the following quantities, - 5.5, for the former, and + 11.1, for the latter, and the difference in favour of the Colonies is + 16.6, that is, as nearly one-sixth of our whole foreign tonnage is to 0.

Before comparing the whole commerce and navigation of these Colonies, with those of the United States, to all parts of the world, it should be remembered, that the latter, by their separation from us, had the good fortune to relieve themselves from all the restraints of dependence, and still to retain most of its advantages, nor were the territorial concessions they obtained of us, more important to their increase, or more strangely deserved, than their commercial privileges. For at the same time that they gained a free intercourse with the whole World, their ships continued to enjoy in our harbours the rights and immunities of British bottoms; they continued to trade with our Colonies, to fish in our waters; and even the

protecting duties, to encourage their produce, were a long time preserved. Add to this, that the war, which soon after embroiled all Europe, threw into their hands the carrying trade of almost the whole Continent, which they used justly to compare to a *vicious cow*, which we held by the horn for them to milk. The Colonies, on the other hand, have felt their want of capital, and other the natural difficulties of their situation, increased, both by the restraints upon themselves, and the preference shewn to others. Unknown, or unencouraged, they seem for a long time to have been regarded as a desperate gamester, who has thrown away vast sums without fortune, or without judgment, despises the little that remains. The laws of navigation indeed, as the fundamental rule of the Empire, the source of all its power and prosperity, are never to be mentioned with complaint, because they bear hard upon any particular branch; but this there was unfortunate in the situation of these Colonies, that wherever those laws were rigidly enforced, they suffered much inconvenience and vexation, and wherever they might have expected some advantage, those laws were easily relaxed. For years the Colonies were unable to contend with the admission of the United States into the West India Islands, to

which, and to the Mother Country, their trade was almost entirely restricted: and it was not till 1809, (before which period the importation of their Timber was but limited and unprotected), that the closing of the Baltic, and the hostility of the North, compelled us to turn at length upon our own resources, and cut down our forests in America. Between these obstructions on the one side, and advantages on the other, it is not a little surprising that neither the commerce nor the navigation, of this portion of our dominions, are in comparative improvement, one step behind the rapid advancement of the United States. Their exports to the whole world have increased, between the years 1669 and 1825, from £2,852,441 to £22,395,463, and the whole amount of tonnage employed thereby, from 351,664 to about 1,114,000 tons, an addition of 685 per cent. in the former, and in the latter of 216. While from these Provinces, the exports, during that time, have risen from £225,878 to about £3,150,057, and the navigation employed thereby from 25,410 to about 689,872, an addition respectively of 1280 per cent. and 2610 per cent. How, and from what sources, this estimate is formed, will be seen by a Table, (No. VII.), in the Appendix.

With regard to the civil and military

expenses of these possessions, taken at their largest estimate, at £500,000 per annum, that can hardly, we think, be considered equal to even the commercial advantages received. For if they supply employment to the amount of £3,000,000 annually, (perhaps the *real* value of our exports thither the last year), to the stock and industry of the Merchant and Manufacturer, and £1,000,000 more (the probable amount of freights) to the Shipowner and Seaman, (to say nothing of the revenue of £300,000, the amount in 1825, we believe, of the duties upon timber), it would be difficult to point out another way by which this £500,000 could be made more productive, or shew what item of our whole appropriation yields a better return. For it cannot be said that equal benefits would have resulted from the same, or some other quarter, had we abandoned these Colonies, or shewn them less preference. On the contrary, had they been ceded to the United States, it is far more probable that our intercourse with them would have increased only in the same ratio as it has with that Republic, and instead of our exports thither being 455 per cent. greater than in 1774, they would be only 245, and our tonnage thither, instead of increasing 2370 per cent., would have diminished more than 5, and amount

now to 10,658 instead of 411,332 tons, and the difference have been added to a Foreign Power. And although exports to the same amount might have been made to the Baltic, and Timber thence procured at a cheaper rate, (except indeed the intercourse with those Powers had been restricted by monopoly and combination, as in 1703, or interrupted by war, as in 1809), yet had such a trade been far less profitable. For there are three great advantages in the Colonial above the Baltic Trade. 1st. The former is domestic instead of foreign, and consequently of twice the value of the latter, as the profit by the exchange, on both sides, is all within the Dominions, and by the stock and industry, and added to the common wealth, of our own Empire. 2nd. It is direct instead of circuitous. Not that timber may not be brought from the Baltic in half the time required from America, but to pay for that timber, or the greater part of it, we have first to carry our manufactures beyond the sea, and bring back some foreign or colonial article, and principally indeed gold and silver, and ship that to the Northern Merchant. To these possessions, on the other hand, nearly all our exports are the immediate production of our own industry. The Colonial Trade, therefore, in reality yields a quicker return. 3rd. It

is carried on in British, instead of foreign bottoms. By which we not only save the freight, but most essentially promote an object, which it has ever been the undoubted interest of the Nation to keep principally in view, the support of our Seamen and Navy. And if these advantages should still appear unequal to the objection, so strong to a superficial observer, that Timber is dearer by the present system, it must yet be a consolation to know, that the difference is not only divided among ourselves, but as the prime cost is about the same, is nearly all given as a bounty to the most useful branches of our productive industry, the Shipping and Manufacturing interests, or applied to the necessities of Government, and substituted for so much taxation. But without the competition of our Colonies, are we sure we should obtain Baltic Timber on the present favourable terms? Great Britain has long been, and for ever must be, dependent upon other Countries for Naval Stores and wood. The Coasts of the Baltic possess, and formerly alone afforded, a near and abundant supply of both. Why did we ever derive either by a long voyage to America? The Coasts of the Baltic unfortunately are not our Colonies. Their Merchants combined in 1703 to raise the price of the former, and to

monopolize its transport, and we were driven to give bounties on its importation from our Colonies. In 1807, their Governments combined to exclude us from the latter also, and we began to enquire with some anxiety whether there was any other quarter of the world from which we might be supplied; and what had then been our situation, if on turning to America, we had found its Northern Provinces in the hands of a Power, which was about to pass acts of Embargo, Non-intercourse, and War? That which has already happened, may again be repeated.

If to these commercial benefits, already so considerable, and capable of such future increase, be added the political results derived to our power, from our possession of this Country, and the dangers to be apprehended from its possession by another, it can hardly appear too dearly purchased at the price of its establishments; especially to a Nation, which is too conscious, that her influence in the World is beyond the proportion of her territory or population in Europe, to confine her views to a single Kingdom, or to one Hemisphere; which has not garrisoned for so many years the Rock of Gibraltar, nor maintained her Forts in Africa, nor conquered or planted many other posts or

Islands, for the immediate return of their trade or revenue; nor refused to the subjects of her very Capital the necessary fuel of life, unless brought by sea from a distant port, because the Coals of Newcastle are cheaper than any elsewhere; but which, having established an Empire, on whose dominions the sun never sets, and whose equal he has never seen, has judged no expenses heavy, which were necessary to secure its general prosperity, no prosperity secure without a superior Navy, and no Navy superior without Colonies and Commerce.

Inconsiderable however as this sum appears upon such a comparison, it may yet be well to examine, whether all of it could probably be saved to the revenue by the proposed abandonment. The expenses of the Civil Government of these Provinces, as much as are borne by the Mother Country, amount only to about £45,000. All the rest is incurred by the Military establishments, which are not required to secure the obedience of the Inhabitants, for that is most voluntary and devoted, but for the safety also of other possessions, the fear of neighbouring rivals, and the general interests of the Empire. Were these withdrawn, must not the garrisons in other places be augmented, in Bermuda, and the West Indies? Or would our fears diminish with the

increase of our enemies, or our forces be lessened with the increase of our fears, or any saving gained in the health or cost of our forces by this change of station? Two hundred men would possibly cease to be a sufficient protection for Newfoundland; nor would perhaps the uneasiness felt for Ireland be any thing allayed, for the intimidating supposition, lately suggested by a Catholic Barrister, of an American Fleet in the Irish Channel, may not prove eventually to have been so very remote, as the Orator, it is hoped, himself imagined. Were the obstacles on that side of the water removed, the Americans know the way over to this, and they would soon learn how to throw 100,000 musquets into Ireland, which they have already learned how to make; and were it the expedition of mad men, and fools, they could bring 10,000 United Irishmen with them, who are both one and the other. It must be better, one would think, that these men and arms should be sent, without return, to Canada, and the United States exhaust their means in imbecile attempts to invade a country, which they never can conquer, as in the last war, or, as it will, or should be, in the next, in protecting their long and defenceless coasts, of the Atlantic in front, and the Lakes in their rear, (neither of which could be endangered without

our occupation of this Territory,) rather than to remove every domestic annoyance, and leave their undivided attention and resources to be applied to, their maritime force, and the attack of more valuable, or more valued, possessions.

If indeed the power and consequence of a Nation does not depend upon the extent of its dominions and number of inhabitants, but the less we possess and expend abroad, the richer and securer we are at home; if the cheapest market be an object of such paramount importance, in political œconomy, as to exclude the distinctions of subject and alien, friend and enemy, security and dependence, and trade with foreigners be as permanent or profitable as domestic commerce within ourselves; we might by the same reasons give up the beautiful and fertile Islands of the West Indies, to the Abolitionists, if Heaven so please, for an experiment upon negro industry and intellect, (since there are, who refuse to be satisfied with the experiment that has been making since the flood upon the whole Continent of Africa,) we might sever Ireland from Great Britain, or Scotland from England, or resolve England again into an Heptarchy, and would mankind remain at peace, and obey the dictates of right reason, all parts perhaps would be benefited, and we might safely

contract our Empire, or even dissolve it: but as force has unhappily been found the best or only means of securing, either the ends of justice, or the advantages of amity and commerce, the same reason that induced men to form societies, must suggest and compel their enlargement, and the greater the proportion of the earth included under one good government, the stronger, the richer, and happier, must that nation be. The increase of production in the Mother Country has of late so far surpassed the increase of consumption, that the grand object of her œconomy is now, to multiply her customers, and open new markets. No class of consumers, it is allowed, is so safe, so constant, and profitable, as we are to ourselves; and if there are causes at home which retard or limit their multiplication, in the Colonies nothing, but our own negligence, can oppose their rapid and almost infinite increase. Had a tithe, had an hundredth part, of the capital lately sunk, in abortive schemes, imaginary mines, and irrecoverable loans, been diverted to the planting and encouraging these possessions, to open Canals for example, between the Bay of Fundy and the Gulph of St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic at Halifax, Lake Erie and Ontario, Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the St. Lawrence and Lake

Champlain, the benefit would have been great and permanent to the Empire, and the profit satisfactory to the adventurers. So inviting are these undertakings, that the capitalists in the United States have long been anxious, and have offered, to perform them, but from a laudable feeling of pride and jealousy, the Colonists have preferred waiting, till they could get assistance from the Mother Country, or till, and the time is not distant, they could effect it of themselves. Indeed some of these enterprises are already in operation, and the rest about to be begun.

To pursue farther the resources and prospects of the British Empire in America, would be long and inapplicable to the present purpose. It is already seen that the Colonies, which remain to us, are now of more value to our commerce and navigation, than were all the Provinces of the United States together in 1774, though these then contained twice the number of inhabitants, and though they have met no obstacle to their improvement, except the war of their own choosing, our colonists have gained rapidly upon them in comparative increase.

It would perhaps be difficult to mention, or almost to imagine, a country, the result of whose industry and commerce could afford a more unmingled satisfaction, at once to the philoso-

pher, the statesman, and œconomist. Trees, which bear no fruit, which contribute nothing to our support, which even cumber the ground, are cut down, to make room for population and subsistence; and are sent and exchanged, in this great mart of the comforts and conveniences of life, for commodities which there could be neither made nor spared; the tillage and pasture, which succeed, supply exports of higher value, and more general demand; the barrenness of rivers and the sea is made to yield the luxuries of either hemisphere; and the very stones are turned to bread. To all concerned, the advantages seem surprisingly great, and mutual. On the one hand, articles, which have received the last labour of human art, are purchased by things useless or even burthensome; on the other, the superfluities of production are given for the necessary materials of future industry; the bulk of which is the most disproportioned to value, and value the least derived from manufacture; while the nature of the voyage, and the size and quantity of ships for the transport, are such, that if they bring but a small addition to our wealth, they contribute largely to the security of all we have. In the meantime the face of a vast country is changed from a wild and silent forest, to the fair improvements of culture and habitation;

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villages and towns spring up; the poor emigrant is received with welcome and a ready engagement; and with the increase of capital and numbers, new resources are discovered, or the old more available. Add to this, that they thus supply employment of £4,000,000 annually to the productive industry, and something besides to the revenue, of Great Britain; and add also the present advantages of the territory they occupy, and its future prospects, in commercial and political importance, and perhaps the inhabitants of no country have less reason to be reproached with what they have done for themselves and the empire, for posterity and mankind. All of which, it may be affirmed, had been lost to us, and worse, added to our rivals, had the Colonists been a little less faithful to the Mother Country, or the Mother Country a little more indifferent to the Colonists.

From these facts and arguments, the conclusion to be drawn is, *not*, we trust, (*in the words of the Edinburgh Review, No. 86.*) "That it " had been better for Great Britain had Canada, " Nova Scotia, &c. continued to this hour in the " possession of their aboriginal savages." An assertion which discovers perhaps no great benevolence of feeling, if accuracy of judgment or calculation. On the contrary, something, it is

hoped, may be collected to justify, or excuse, the position hazarded in our commencement, that *Great Britain still possesses the most valuable portion of North America, and does not know it.* Or, whatever it may be, that value at least must be greatly impaired by the compromise of the present question of Boundary, and even the possession eventually lost. But from what acquaintance with the country, what circumstance in its situation and history, what mode of reasoning from the past, or conjecturing for the future, it is asserted, that these colonies *must* merge in the American Republic, and “*That there is not a man of sense in the empire, who does not look forward to the dissolution, at no distant period, of their connexion with England,*”—has not been disclosed, and, notwithstanding the penalty prefixed, we confess ourselves unable to divine. According to the view here taken, the anticipation must appear improbable, the reflection unmerited. So improbable, and so unmerited, that nothing, we think, but the adoption of the sentiments and measures of such œconomists, by government, or the public, could perhaps bring it about. Assertions like these are there read with great pain and uneasiness, and can produce no good effect, among a class of our fellow-subjects, whom, if it be not our interest to conciliate, it




were wantonness to estrange, and ungenerous to insult. And if such were ever to become the words and feelings, not indeed of the Government, nor let us a moment suppose that disposition to exist with them, but of the Public, or any considerable Party, and the opinion of our Colonists thence could reach us in reply, it would be expressed, we may believe, in some such sentiments as these.

‘ We are not conscious of any thing in the character, either of this Country, to make that event so indifferent, or of its Inhabitants, to make it probable. To commend one or the other to your notice might appear an over estimate of ourselves. If indeed you can see nothing in the present or future advantages of these Colonies, that may be useful to your power or commerce; if you would add, to the desertion of our Red Brethren, another example of the folly, and danger, of supporting the cause, or trusting to the protection of Great Britain, you are certainly at liberty to abandon the Country. But, for if beggars, we are not convicts, or *convict* only of Treason, which was Loyalty to you, and *beggared* by its consequences, you are not at liberty to sell or cede us to the United States, nor was it upon such hopes or conditions that you led, and we

' followed you, hither. We will endeavour
 ' rather to confederate, and set up for ourselves,
 ' and perhaps by unanimity and resolution, may
 ' obtain from fortune, or the justice of our
 ' neighbours, what we sought in vain under your
 ' protection. Only leave us at once, before your
 ' indifference has betrayed our natural defences,
 ' or our children shall have imbibed those prin-
 ' ciples, which brought our fathers into exile.
 ' Yet think us not so insensible to the name and
 ' advantages of British Subjects, as to desire so
 ' desperate an alternative. Let us rather advise
 ' and intreat you, for our own sakes, and for
 ' yours, not to harbour such an intention, nor
 ' use such language. You are so rich, so great,
 ' and so distant, that perhaps you estimate the
 ' lesser members of the Empire below their real
 ' worth. Formerly the feet and hands accused
 ' the body, but in these days the body would
 ' appear to be complaining of the feet and hands.
 ' Yet the blood, or treasure, supplied to them,
 ' flows back to you by other channels, invigo-
 ' rating all by circulation: there is no part per-
 ' haps that adds not something to the strength
 ' and welfare of the whole: and if we seem to
 ' contribute little in our present infancy, more
 ' may be expected of us hereafter. You little
 ' know what the United States are doing on this

' side of the *Great Lake*, or what might be done
 ' here by yourselves. Believe us, there is no-
 ' thing in the one to despise, nor in the other to
 ' neglect. It is in vain that you multiply, at
 ' home, production beyond consumption, or po-
 ' pulation beyond subsistence: either requisite
 ' may be supplied by us. Here you have land
 ' that wants labourers; there labourers that
 ' want land. Unless you can add to the extent
 ' of your dominions there, or have some other
 ' machine for making corn, transplant some of
 ' your surplus inhabitants, and with them some
 ' of your surplus capital, to this vast and fertile
 ' Country, and we together will weave such a
 ' band around the North States of America, as
 ' shall at least prevent their rising up, the mo-
 ' ment you begin a war in Europe, to demand
 ' the commerce of your enemies, or attack your
 ' own. By this time you ought to be too well
 ' acquainted with the character of that People,
 ' to expect from them, either neutrality in war,
 ' or reciprocity in peace. Do not flatter your-
 ' selves with the idle hope, that the new Re-
 ' publics of South America, so feeble, so distant,
 ' and divided, are to balance the power of the
 ' United States in this Hemisphere; or that the
 ' population of Russia, unequal to the forests
 ' of Asia and Europe, is to overflow, and meet





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' them from the Pacific; nor yet that any dis-
 ' union among themselves can ever make the
 ' people less enterprising, or their government
 ' more inefficient. The competition and contest
 ' that is to be tried with them, there is no Power
 ' on earth that will do for you but yourselves, no
 ' place for the struggle but this. Nor will this
 ' long remain to you, if the possession is thus
 ' to be stolen of your defensible frontiers, and
 ' you will continue to negotiate with the Ame-
 ' ricans, as though their friendship were certain,
 ' or their enmity harmless. For beware lest
 ' you think it more difficult to stop the course of
 ' the St. John's, or turn the St. Lawrence from
 ' the Ocean, than to prevent the American
 ' People from driving us before them into the
 ' Sea, and shutting you out from the land, when
 ' they once establish themselves on those Rivers,
 ' in that Tract and Position they now claim, and
 ' attempt. If you can find in our connexion,
 ' the inducement of any interest, or the obliga-
 ' tion of any duty, we conjure you not to neglect
 ' this question. Do not suffer a Boundary to
 ' be recorded in the Map, whose very figure
 ' will become a testimony of reproach to you
 ' with posterity. Do not suffer it to be said,
 ' that the Americans here treat the King's
 ' Colonists and Authorities, as they dare not

' treat their own *Squatters*. For, finally, though
 ' it should not be necessary to repeat what you
 ' yourselves must already as well know, yet we
 ' are afraid, in the concerns of so great an Em-
 ' pire, lest ours may be forgotten, let us once
 ' more warn you, that we, who acknowledge the
 ' same allegiance, the same interests with your-
 ' selves, are beset by a People, the most for-
 ' midable of your rivals, the most implacable of
 ' your enemies, and are in danger of being be-
 ' trayed by you, as though you were not at the
 ' same time selling yourselves. The territorial
 ' and commercial concessions already made to
 ' the United States, at our expense, have been
 ' such, that these are now perhaps the last that
 ' remain for them to demand. Do not suffer
 ' them to persuade you, and do not persuade
 ' yourselves, that it is merely a Tract of 10,000
 ' square miles, of vacant forest, and 1500 im-
 ' portunate Colonists only, that are at stake; it
 ' is the connexion of your Provinces with each
 ' other, of the Canadas with the Sea, of the
 ' Canadas with Great Britain, that you are
 ' asked to concede; you are negotiating for your
 ' last possessions in America, for the superiority,
 ' for the very presence, of your Navy on its
 ' Coasts; in short, though you will not believe
 ' it, for the whole Colonies, and Commerce, and

‘ Fisheries, of the Western World. Or if we
‘ are mistaken in these consequences, there is
‘ one at least in which we cannot be deceived,
‘ and which, though perhaps the least impor-
‘ tant to you, may be by no means the least
‘ painful to us ; *It is from your conduct in the*
‘ *present question that we are to learn in*
‘ *future how to accommodate our own.*’

APPENDIX.

(No. I.)

EXTRACT from the Second Volume of the Secret Proceeding of Congress, published at Boston, a few years ago, by a Resolution of Congress, and under the direction of the President of the United States. Page 225.

“ August 17th, 1779.

“ CONGRESS proceeded to the consideration of the
“ Instructions of the Ministers to be appointed for negotiating a Peace with Great Britain.” (*After other matter the Instructions state*)—“ The Boundaries of
“ these States are as follow ”—(*Here the same Line is described, as in the Definitive Treaty of 1783, as far as— to the mouth of St. Mary's River in the Atlantic Ocean—when the Instructions proceed*)—“ and East
“ by a Line to be drawn along the middle of the St. John's River from its source to its mouth in the Bay
“ of Fundy,” (*followed by this expression*) “ if the
“ same can be obtained from Great Britain.”

On the 16th of August 1782, another Committee of Congress made a Report for the use of the American Commissioners, engaged in negotiating the Treaty of

Peace, in which the following passage, at page 180. Vol. II. occurs—" It is to be observed, that when the " Boundaries of the United States were declared to be " Ultimatum, it was not thought advisable to continue " the War merely to obtain Territory as far as St. " John's River."

The Commissioners appointed, under the Treaty of 1794, to examine and decide what River was truly intended under the name of the River St. Croix, considered it necessary to obtain of Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, two of the Plenipotentiaries on the part of the United States in 1783, all the information in their power. Mr. Adams, then President of the United States, was accordingly examined, under oath, before the Commissioners, and the second interrogation put, was

" What Rivers were claimed to, or talked of, by the Commissioners," (viz. who negotiated the Treaty of 1783,) " on either side, as a proposed Boundary, and " for what reason ?

" Answer. The British Commissioners first claimed " to Piscatawa, then to Kennebec, then to Penobscot, " and at length to St. Croix, as marked on Mitchell's " Map. One of the American Ministers at first proposed the River St. John's, as marked on Mitchell's " Map; but his colleagues showing, that as the St. " Croix was the River mentioned in the Charter of " Massachusetts's Bay, they could not justify insisting " on the St. John's as the ultimatum, he agreed with " them to adhere to the Charter of Massachusetts's " Bay."

(Taken from the New York Albion.)

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(No. III.)

The joint Address of the Council and House of Assembly of New Brunswick respecting the Boundary between that Province and the United States.

" TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY,

" The joint Address of your Majesty's Council and House of Assembly, of the Province of New Brunswick, in General Assembly,

" Most humbly sheweth,

" THAT the Council and House of Assembly view with great surprise and concern the recent attempts made by the Governments of Massachusetts and Maine to disturb the possession of your Majesty, and the jurisdiction of this Province, in a Tract of Country on the Saint John and Madawaska Rivers.

" They beg leave humbly to represent to your Majesty that the Inhabitants of this Tract of Country, so far as it is settled, are, with the exception of a few Persons, who have lately become Settlers, French Acadians, and their descendants, the first of whom removed thither from the lower parts of the Country, soon after the Treaty of 1783, and the immediately subsequent erection of this Province, under the full faith that they were planting themselves upon British Territory. That grants of their lands were at the beginning of the settlement made to the Settlers under the Great Seal of this Province. That Militia Companies were organized in this settlement by General CARLETON, the first Governor of this Province, at so early a period as the year 1786. That Magistrates and Parish Officers have been from time to time appointed there under the laws and Institutions of this Province, and the process of your Majesty's Courts in this Province has uniformly run thither. That the Inhabitants vote at elections for the County of York in this Province, and that all the powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction have in fact been

exercised by the constituted authorities of this Province, throughout the whole of this Tract of Country bordering on the Saint John and Madawaska Rivers, in the same manner as in any other part of the Province without question or disturbance quite up to the period of the Treaty of Ghent in the year 1814, and from thence until the recent attempts at interference, which it is the present object of the Council and House of Assembly to represent to your Majesty.

" It is well known that this Tract of Country is included in a claim to a much larger extent made by the Government of the United States, before the Commission that was established under the fifth article of the Treaty of Ghent, for settling the Boundary in this quarter, and was also claimed on the part of your Majesty, before the same Commission, as belonging to your Majesty. It would be out of place on the present occasion to enter upon the grounds upon which the claim on the part of your Majesty may be supported, but as in some official documents which have emanated from the Governments of Maine and Massachusetts, it seems to be held out that your Majesty is claiming a part of the Territory of those States, to the cession of which their consent must be obtained, it is proper to remark that the question of right between the two Governments must be determined by the Provisions of the Treaty of 1783, which prescribes the line of demarcation, and that if what your Majesty claims as your just and undoubted right according to the true construction of that Treaty be finally confirmed, the Tract of Country now in question does not and never did *de jure* form a part of Massachusetts or of Maine, as *de facto* it is not and never has been in the possession or under the jurisdiction of either of those States.

" The Council and House of Assembly conceive that upon every principle of Justice, and from a due regard to the friendly understanding happily subsisting between the two Countries, the possession and actual exercise of jurisdiction, which existed at the time of making the Treaty of Ghent, the instrument which provided for a decision of any conflicting claims between the two nations in this quarter, should have remained sacred and inviolate until that decision may take place.

The Government of this Province has done no more than to exercise the ordinary powers of Sovereignty and jurisdiction, to which it succeeded on the first erection of the Province in the year 1784, and to which it has ever since been accustomed, and it was in this ordinary exercise of those powers that the Licences to cut Pine Timber, which have been so much complained of by the Governments of Maine and Massachusetts were issued—upon these complaints being conveyed to your Majesty by the General Government of the United States, your Majesty's Government, with that spirit of conciliation towards the United States which it has uniformly exhibited, directed the Government of this Province to abstain from granting Licences to cut Timber on the Territory claimed by that power. This disposition to remove grounds of complaint, and prevent causes of collision, having been thus evinced by your Majesty, the Council and House of Assembly feel themselves imperatively called upon to represent to your Majesty the doings of Public Agents of the Governments of the United States, and of the States of Maine and Massachusetts of late years within this Territory, thus being in the actual possession and under the jurisdiction and Laws of this Province.

"In the year 1820, the Marshal of the District of Maine, professing to Act under a Law of the United States, commissioned an assistant to go into the above mentioned French Settlement, commonly known by the name of the Madawaska Settlement, and there take an enumeration of the Inhabitants, as being within the said District. This enumeration was accordingly made, and the Inhabitants of this Settlement included in the public returns, as Citizens of the United States, and part of the Inhabitants of Maine.

"In the year 1821, a Senator of the State of Maine, professing to act as an Agent of the Government of that State, came into this Province, and seized and marked a quantity of Pine Timber, lying in the River St. John, within our acknowledged Boundaries, far below the Line claimed by the United States, as having been cut on the River Restook, in the Territory of the United States; (the place where this Timber was alleged to have been cut, being part of the Territory in dispute

between the two Governments,) and induced the persons who had this Timber in possession, to give obligations for paying certain sums of money therefore to the Government of Maine.

" In the last year, 1825, the Governments of the States of Massachusetts and Maine, appear deliberately to have adopted measures to subvert your Majesty's actual possession and jurisdiction, in all that part of the Territory claimed by the United States, which lies on the St. John and Madawaska Rivers. By Resolves of the Legislatures of those States, which have been published to the world, Land Agents were authorized to convey to the Settlers in this Territory by good and sufficient Deeds, one hundred Acres each, of the Land by them possessed, to include their improvements on their respective Lots, for a certain sum to be paid for the use of the said States. These Settlers, let it be remembered, are your Majesty's Subjects, the Lands thus by them possessed, are held by Grants from the Crown, and these Lands and the Inhabitants upon them, whose number now exceeds fifteen hundred souls, have been under your Majesty's protection and Sovereignty, and been governed in quiet by the Laws of this Province for the last forty years. The Land Agents of the States above mentioned, appear by their own shewing, in a Report which has also been published to the world, to have zealously executed their Commission. Early in the month of October last, they proceeded to the Settlement in question, commenced surveying the Settlers' Lots, to several of whom they made deeds in conformity to the above mentioned Resolves of the Legislatures of the two States, and finding there was not then time to complete their Surveys, deemed it sufficient to make a few Deeds, and then post up Notices of the disposition of the State towards the Settlers, at the Catholic Church, and at the Grist Mills in the before mentioned Settlement, of your Majesty's Subjects at Madawaska, now under the jurisdiction and Laws of this Province. They acknowledge having been informed, that the Permits from the Government of this Province to cut Pine Timber, for the approaching winter, had been withdrawn, and reciprocate this Act of moderation and forbearance on the part of your Ma-

jesty's Government, by appointing an Agent at Madawaska, and another at the Restook, with power to grant permits to cut Pine Timber, on the same disputed Territory, which they affect to consider their own soil, and upon which your Majesty has desisted from exercising this accustomed right of Sovereignty while the question of Boundary remains undecided, at the express instance of the Government of the United States. They make what they call domiciliary visits to many of the Settlers, to whom they explain the objects of their visit to the Country, whom they state to have expressed great delight at the prospect of being received into the family of Maine, to have little confidence in the value of their Grants, and to have made application to the Legislatures of those States for obtaining Deeds of all the Lands they have in possession, these Agents being authorized to convey only one hundred acres to each Settler,—not contented with these measures in the disputed Territory, they proceed down the River St. John, into the acknowledged and unquestioned Territory of your Majesty, and there sound the dispositions of your Majesty's Subjects, to become Citizens of the United States, upon a scheme of exchange of Territory which they profess to set forth, and they report to the Governments under which they Act, that the greater part of these Inhabitants would be well pleased with the exchange. On their return to their own Country, they recommend to the Governor of the State of Maine, and state it to have been approved of by him, that two Justices of the Peace be commissioned, that a deputy Sheriff or Constable be appointed, that one or more Military districts be formed at Madawaska, and at a suitable time be so organized that they may have a Representative in the Legislature of Maine, that authority be granted to sell to the Madawaska Settlers, the Land they have in possession more than one hundred Acres, for a reasonable consideration, and that a bushed winter road be cut from the head waters of the Penobscot, in a direction near the head of the Restook, and continued to Madawaska or Fish River, the Tract of Country through which this proposed road is to pass, being also a part of the disputed Territory before referred to.

" All this appears by a document published in the American Newspapers, purporting to be the official ' Report of the Agent of the Land Office ' of Massachusetts, and dated, ' Land Office, Boston, November 10th, 1825.'

" It might have been added, because it is a well known fact, which has been verified on oath, that these Agents also endeavoured to persuade the Inhabitants of Madawaska not to attend a Militia training then about to be held under the Laws of this Province, and offered to some of them, if they would not attend, to pay any fines that might be recovered against them for their delinquency. This attempt however was unavailing, for the General Training was held on the fourth of October last, in the Settlement of Madawaska, and upwards of three hundred men under forty-five years of age were present at it: And the Council and Assembly are well persuaded, that all the other attempts of these Land Agents to seduce your Majesty's Subjects in this quarter, from their allegiance, and to shake their faith in their titles to their Lands, and in your Majesty's support and protection, were equally ineffectual.

" Nevertheless the Council and House of Assembly cannot view these proceedings of the Governments of the States of Massachusetts and Maine, and of their authorized Agents, without great regret and alarm. They cannot reconcile them to those principles of moderation and equity, which have induced the two nations of late years so often to refer their differences, as well with regard to disputed points of Boundary, as to other matters of high import, to tribunals of their own selection for amicable adjustment, nor to that spirit of courtesy and conciliation which ought always to subsist between friendly powers.

" Had any Peace Officers of this Province detected these Land Agents in the course of the proceedings above detailed, it would have been their unquestionable duty to have secured their persons, and to have brought them before the proper municipal Tribunal in this Province, for an infraction of your Majesty's Sovereignty in places under its actual exercise. For although your Majesty has thought proper to abstain from granting Licences to your Subjects to cut Timber on the wilder-

ness Lands claimed by the United States, the Council and House of Assembly have not understood that your Majesty has abandoned or means to abandon, under present circumstances, any rights of practical Sovereignty which your Majesty has been accustomed to exercise in any parts of the disputed Territory, which have been, and now are, in fact, occupied and held as British Settlements, and under your Majesty's jurisdiction. In consequence of a remonstrance made by the Lieutenant Governor of this Province to your Majesty's Minister at Washington, and by him conveyed to the Government of the United States, the Legislature of Massachusetts appears to have suspended the execution of the Resolves above mentioned, until their Session in the month of June next. But should these Resolves, or the additional measures recommended by the Land Agents of the two States, be attempted to be put in force while the question of Boundary remains unsettled, it may be confidently asserted that the Government of this Province will not tamely surrender the Sovereignty which has been uniformly exercised in the Territory in question, and the most unpleasant collisions may be expected to ensue.

"While the Council and House of Assembly deeply feel the importance of a speedy settlement of this disputed Boundary, they can by no means accede to the proposition for an adjustment made by the Land Agents of the States of Massachusetts and Maine, in the report above alluded to in what they term an exchange of Territory, by leaving to your Majesty all the Lands lying North Eastward of the Rivers Saint John and Madawaska, and taking for the United States a portion of Territory, on the west side of the River Saint John as far down as Eel River, far below the line now claimed by the United States. This would be to vary both the Line and the principle of Boundary in this quarter as designated in the Treaty of 1783. There is moreover engrafted on this proposition a right to the free Navigation and use of the River St. John to its mouth, and such a compromise it is stated would be for the mutual advantage of the two Nations.

"The Council and House of Assembly humbly conceive that the inconveniences and disadvantages to your

Majesty's Interests of a River Boundary have been already so much experienced in other parts of your Majesty's North American Dominions, as to render it altogether inexpedient to adopt such a Boundary in this quarter, especially if the consequence is to be that a Foreign nation is to have a free right of navigation of a Great River lying altogether within your Majesty's Territories for a distance of near two hundred miles down to its mouth in the Bay of Fundy, and to a coast navigation from thence along your Majesty's Territories for a distance of sixty miles further until it meets its own sea board. The facilities for illicit trade, the exposure of frontier in a Military view, and the controul of the communications between your Majesty's Provinces, which such an arrangement would afford to a Foreign Power, are in addition to the relinquishment of a large portion of very valuable Territory, most cogent reasons against adopting it. The Council and House of Assembly on the contrary entertain the most sanguine hope, that your Majesty's Government will maintain the true principle on which the designation of Boundary in this quarter in the Treaty of 1783 was founded, namely, to leave within the Territories of the respective powers, the whole course of those Great Rivers, quite up to their sources, which have their mouths within the same Territories. This is a principle in full accordance with that spirit of reciprocal advantage and mutual convenience, which was the declared object of the provisional articles of Peace afterwards framed into the Treaty of 1783, which will make the line of Boundary to be a substantial separation between the two distinct nations, will prevent that constant contact between their respective subjects that inevitably leads to dissension and difficulty, and will tend more than any one circumstance that can be named to preserve the integrity of your Majesty's remaining North American Colonies.

"The Council and House of Assembly beg leave with great humility to lay this representation at the foot of the Throne. They cherish with undiminished confidence the persuasion that your Majesty will continue to bestow that gracious attention and regard to the rights and interests of your North American Dominions for which they have hitherto had so much reason to be grateful."

(No. IV.)

*The Report of one of the American Agents to his
Government.*

Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Land Office, Boston, Nov. 10, 1825.

May it please your Excellency.

THE Legislature of this Commonwealth passed several resolves, dated 16th February, and 11th June last, in concurrence with resolves of the Legislature of the State of Maine, by which it was made my duty, in conjunction with the Land Agent of the State of Maine, "forthwith to take effectual measures to ascertain the extent of the depredations committed on the lands belonging to this Commonwealth and the State of Maine, by whom the same have been committed, and under what authority, if any, such depredations have been made, and all other facts necessary to bring the offenders to justice, also to make and execute good and sufficient deeds, conveying to the Settlers on the undivided public lands on the St. John and Madawaska Rivers in actual possession as aforesaid, their heirs and assigns, 100 acres each, of the land by them possessed to include their improvements on their respective lots, they paying to the said Agents for the use of this Commonwealth, five dollars each, and the expense of surveying the same. And also to sell the timber on such of the undivided public Lands, as lie contiguous to, and near to the waters of the river St. John, in all cases where such sale will, in the opinion of the Land Agent, promote the interest of this Commonwealth."

In obedience to, and in pursuance of said resolves, and in consequence of the claim made by the Province of New Brunswick to a large portion of the State of Maine, and granting permits to sundry persons to cut timber, and have, and still are exercising jurisdictional powers over the territory and inhabitants residing north of Marshall, it was thought expedient to make inquiries relative

to the facts, and that some possessory acts on the part of the two States should be resorted to without delay. The agent aforesaid took measures in the first place to ascertain whether any timber had been cut encroaching upon the territory of Maine, and if so, by whom, and under what authority. We ascertained from the lumberers themselves that a large amount of timber had been taken over our line, by permits issued from the Surveyor General's Office of the Province of New Brunswick, the names of the persons having said Permits, and the amount they have cut. We also learned that Permits were issued for the approaching winter. Under these circumstances, and to carry into effect the other resolves, it was necessary that we should make a journey to that section of the country. Accordingly, by agreement, I accompanied General Irish, the Land Agent for the State of Maine, the beginning of September to Bangor, where we engaged two men to take a batteau up Penobscot, Matawainkeag, and Barkenhegan Rivers, and over Schoodic Lake to Woodstock, on St. John River, and there remain our arrival. We proceeded to Fredericton by the way of Eastport and St. John City. When at Fredericton, we called at the Surveyor General's Office, and stated to him we wished to obtain some documents from his office, relative to permits granted for cutting timber upon the Arcostook and Madawaski rivers, to which he replied that he could not furnish such documents without first consulting the Governor, who was then absent on a journey, and would not return for several days. We observed to him, that perhaps when we explained to him more particularly what we wanted, he would not think it necessary to advise with the Governor, and if he would name an hour that day or the next, we would attend; he however declined acting until he had seen the Governor. We made a written communication, stating the substance of our request, and that we were going up the river and would call at his office for an answer on our return. We then proceeded up river to Woodstock, where we found our boatmen, and after all things were in readiness, we continued up river, and about twenty miles below Madawaska river we met a Mr. Baker in a lumber boat coming down. Mr. Baker formerly lived in Bingham, but now resides at his Mills

at Marymiticook, fourteen miles above Madawaska river; he finding out our business, left his boat and followed us up, and overtook us a little above Madawaska river, and continued with us up to his place at Marymiticook. He is an intelligent man, we received from him much valuable information as to the courses, distances and forms of the lakes, rivers, &c.—also relative to permits granted by the Province of New Brunswick for cutting timber, and with the names, dispositions and customs of the Madawaska settlers. He informed us there were eight or ten families, most of whom came from the States, now residing at Fish river, about twenty miles above his residence, and that Wilmot and Peters, merchants of Fredericton, were now building mills at the mouth of said river. We did not conceive it to be necessary for us to go up further—we commenced surveying the settlers' lots of one hundred acres each, to several of whom we have made deeds in conformity to said resolves, but to survey all the lots in the possession of the settlers, would have employed our time till mid winter; we thought therefore, it would be quite sufficient to make a few deeds, and then post up public notices of the disposition of the State towards the settlers, which we did at the Catholic Church and at the Grist Mills; these notices will probably be seen by most of the settlers.

The water in the several rivers and streams being low, much more so than was ever known before by the oldest inhabitants, and diminishing daily, we concluded it would not be possible for us to return by the way of Matewamkeag River as we had intended, we therefore gave our boatmen ten days supplies of provisions, with instructions to go up to Fish River, and from thence cross over to Bangor by the head waters of the Penobscot River, and make a critical examination of the country, noting the streams, lakes and rivers, and generally all the information in relation to that section, that came to their knowledge.

We then took Mr. Baker into our Batteau, and proceeded down to St. John river, making domiciliary visits to many of the settlers, with whom we conversed and explained the objects of our visit; they all expressed great satisfaction and delight at the prospect of being received into the family of Maine, and were ready to take deeds

of their lots, but most of them have in possession from four to six hundred acres, and are desirous of purchasing at a fair rate sufficient to cover their possessions; they have accordingly made applications to be submitted to the Legislature for that purpose. The Eastern boundary line crosses the St. John river about two miles above the grand falls—from the line to the Madawaska river is about thirty miles, the settlers are situated from eighty to one hundred rods apart, on each side of the river, nearly the whole distance, we counted the houses, in all two hundred and twenty-two, averaging eight persons in each, (which is considered a low average) will make the whole number one thousand seven hundred and seventy-six—they are a very industrious, civil and hospitable people, and well deserving the fostering care of government, many of whom have grants of their lands from the Province of New Brunswick, but they have little confidence in the value of the grants.—Between the grand falls and Eel river we undertook to number the houses on the west bank in order to have some means of estimating the amount of population, but the smoke came upon us from the burning woods so astonishingly dense and suffocating, that we were frustrated in this design; we however obtained some information from inquiry to satisfy us that there are over two hundred and fifty families. These settlers are composed of half-pay officers, refugees and their descendants, also many Irish and some Scotch. We conversed with many of them to learn their dispositions for or against an exchange of territory: we found, generally, the descendants of Yankees would be pleased with it, but the half-pay officers and those now in the employ of government, would be very much averse—the first are much the most numerous.

The land on the west side of St. John River, generally speaking, is of an excellent quality, greatly superior to the east side. There are large tracts of rich interval; back of the intervals the land rises up a beautiful glacis, resembling art more than nature; after ascending the glacis you come to extensive tracts of table land, and further back to gentle swells of hard wood. This description, however, is not without some exceptions. The settlers raise large supplies of wheat, oats,

barley, hay, and the best potatoes I ever met with, and indeed every article that can be raised in New England they have in abundance, with the exception of Indian corn, they are not, however, what we should call good husbandmen.

The land on the Arcostook River is also of an excellent quality for cultivation : there are upwards of twenty families settled on the banks of this river ; they all do something in agriculture, but most of them employ their time principally in lumbering ; they are very anxious to be quieted in their possessions, but we had no authority relating to them. On our way to New Brunswick, we were informed that the Government had received instructions, from home, not to grant any more permits for cutting timber upon the Arcostook or Madawaska Rivers, until the boundary lines are permanently established. This information has been confirmed to us by the lumberers, with this addition, that the permits given for the approaching winter have been recalled, which has disappointed a great many who had previously got their supplies up river with a view to lumber extensively. We thought, under these circumstances, it would be well to make some provisions, by which they might obtain timber from our soil, and prevent their disappointment, inasmuch as the supplies they have of provisions, &c. near our lines, would undoubtedly enable them to plunder, and would be so used if not permitted to cut. We appointed, with this view, an agent at Madawaska, and another at Arcostook, with power to grant permits under certain conditions and restrictions.

On our return to Fredericton, we called at the Surveyor General's Office for an answer to our communication ; he was not in his office. The Clerk informed us that he was at his house, as his dwelling was in danger from the burning woods. He (the Clerk) did not know of any answer, but that the Surveyor General wished to be informed when we called, and that he would immediately inform him. We told the clerk, that if any communication was to be made, we should be found at the Fredericton Hotel until Thursday morning, seven o'clock, (this being Tuesday)—we received no reply whatever. Whether it was the intention of the Surveyor General to withhold from us the information we wished, or whether

it was owing to the confusion the town was in, in consequence of the conflagration of a large part of the village, we do not know, but we have reason to believe it was from the first motive. The information has however been fully obtained from the lumberers as before mentioned. In conversation with the merchants of the city of St. John, and Fredericton, we found they expressed generally the opinion, that by the treaty of 1783 we obtained an advantage over them, which at the time was little understood; and that according to the treaty, the Province of New Brunswick would be nearly disjoined from Lower Canada, which could not be submitted to; and that all that territory north-east of St. John and Madawaska rivers must be theirs at any rate, by purchase or compromise; should a compromise be made, as has several times been intimated, so as to surrender up our claim to the above territory, and receive therefore all west of the St. John river, as low down as Eel river and North Lake, we shall lose about one-half the settlers at Madawaska, as about that proportion are on the east side, and obtain a larger number on the west side, below the Grand Falls that are hardly worth having. As it is of importance to the British to have a free use of the Madawaska river as a highway for the transportation of the Mail, &c. we ought, at the same time, to require the right of a free navigation and use of the St. John river, for the transportation of our lumber and other commodities, to Eastport and elsewhere, without being subject to duties; and also that the several grants made to the Madawaska settlers be taken into account, and that compensation be made for the timber cut under the permits. Should a compromise upon these terms be made, we think it would be of mutual advantage to both nations; for our present line cuts off a portion of the Aroostigouch river, where there is a large body of fine pine timber growth.

We have recommended to Governor Parris (which has met his entire approbation) the following measures, to be adopted as expedient for the interest of all concerned, viz:

That two Justices of the Peace be commissioned; that a Deputy Sheriff or Constable be appointed; and that one or more Military Districts be formed at Madawaska, and

at a suitable time to be so organized that they may have a Representative in the Legislature of Maine; and we think it would be the interest of both States, that authority be granted to sell to the Madawaska settlers the land they have in possession, more than one hundred acres, for a reasonable consideration; and that a bushed winter road be cut from the head quarters at Penobscot, in a direction near the head of the Aroostook, and continued to Madawaska or Fish Rivers; the distance is about one hundred miles; the expence would not exceed twenty dollars per mile, and it would probably enhance the value of each township through which it goes, equal to the cost of the whole road, and open a country that has scarcely been seen.

I herewith have the honour to transmit a sketch of that part of Maine, as all the maps now in use are very erroneous in regard to that quarter.

I am, with the greatest respect,

Your Excellency's most obedient,

and very humble Servant,

GEO. W. COFFIN,
Land Agent.

No. V.

Comparison of the Increase of the annual Exports from Great Britain, to all parts of the World, to the United States, the West Indies, and the North American Colonies, respectively, from the Year 1774 to 1824, on an average of ten Years preceding each Period, according to their official Value.—(Moreau's Table.)

Years.	Whole Exports.	To the United States.	West Indies.	N. A. Colonies.
1774	£16,406,110	2,316,737	1,289,006	344,551
1784	13,837,621	443,358	1,411,149	858,164
1794	21,130,167	2,964,043	2,152,061	870,591
1804	32,875,149	6,140,572	3,903,448	1,028,846
1814	40,932,265	5,138,646	4,904,940	1,690,733
1824	55,279,919	7,997,692	5,162,219	1,911,336
Comparative Increase of the several Amounts in 1824 above those of 1774.	235 per cent.	245 per cent.	300 per cent.	455 per cent.
Comparative Increase of the proportion of the parts to the whole.		$\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.	$1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.	$1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Exports of 1825.	60,898,632	7,141,285	4,870,835	2,244,245

1½ per cent.	2,244,245
1½ per cent.	4,870,835
1 per cent.	7,141,285
	60,898,632
Comparative Increase of the proportion of the parts to the whole. Exports of 1825.	

*Comparison of the Increase of British Tonnage employed
Great Britain and the United States, the*

YEARS.	WHOLE TONNAGE.	TO T ^{ES} .
1772.	Average of the Amount cleared outwards on the 3 preceding years(1) . } 834,066	Medium of 219 tered an Average ceding Tonnage which i. e. (2)
1789.	The like Average(1) 1,376,841	The like M ^{6,106}
1799.	Like Average on 10 years(1) 1,322,238	Medium ar ^{4,196} years(3)
1808. The Colonial re- turns from 1808 to 1814 are lost.	The like on 9 years(1) . . . 1,433,691	1,735
1824. Comparison of the several Amounts in 1824 with 1772. }	The like on 10 years(1) . . . 2,229,540	Average cleared ^{7,149}
	167 per cent. Increase.	21
Comparison of the proportion of the parts to the whole in 1824 with 1772. }	5 ⁵ _T
1825.	Whole Amount cleared(1) . 2,262,458	Whole Am ^{11,332}

(1) Moreau's Table.

(2) Report of the Lord

Comparison of the Increase of British Tonnage employed annually, between Great Britain and the United States, the West Indies, and the North America.

YEARS.	WHOLE TONNAGE.	TO THE UNITED STATES.	
1772.	Average of the Amount } cleared outwards on the } 834,066 3 preceding years(1) . }	Medium of the Amounts entered and cleared on an Average of the 3 preceding years. Whole Tonnage 86,745. Of which $\frac{9}{8}$ were British, i. e. (2) }	65,058
1789.	The like Average(1) 1,376,841	The like Medium & Average(2)	52,595
1799.	Like Average on 10 years(1) 1,322,238	Medium and Average on 10 years(3) }	11,082
1808.	The like on 9 years(1) . . . 1,433,691		
The Colonial returns from 1808 to 1814 are lost.			
1824.	The like on 10 years(1) . . . 2,229,540	Average of the Amount } cleared on 10 years(4) . }	51,188
Comparison of the several Amounts in 1824 with 1772. }	167 per cent. Increase.	21 per cent. Decrease.	
Comparison of the proportion of the parts to the whole in 1824 with 1772. }	5 $\frac{5}{10}$ per cent. Decrease.	
1825.	Whole Amount cleared(1) . 2,262,458	Whole Amount cleared(4) . . 43,139	

(1) Moreau's Table.

(2) Report of the Lords of Trade in 91.

(3) Ma

(No. VI.)

Annually, between Great Britain and all Parts of the World, (including to Ireland), and
 at Indies, and the North American Colonies, respectively from the year 1772.

UNITED STATES.		WEST INDIES.		NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES.	
Amounts en- gaged on an the 3 pre- s. Whole 5,745. Of re British,	65,058	The same Medium and } Average(2) }	75,143	The same Medium and } Average(2) }	11,219
h & Average(2)	52,595	Like Medium and Average(2)	128,207	Like Medium and Average(2)	46,106
verage on 10 }	11,082	Like on 10 years(3)	143,402	Like on 10 years(3)	34,196
				Like on 9 years(4)	61,735
the Amount }	51,188	Average of the Amount }	217,856	Medium and Average on }	277,149
years(4) . }		cleared on 2 years(4) . . }		10 years(4) }	
cent. Decrease.		189 per cent. Increase.		2370 per cent. Increase.	
cent. Decrease.		7 $\frac{1}{5}$ per cent. Increase.		11 $\frac{1}{10}$ per cent. Increase.	
cleared(4) . .	43,139	Whole Amount cleared(4) . .	205,191	Whole Amount cleared(4) . .	411,332

Trade in 91.

(3) Macpherson's Annals of Commerce.

(4) Official Returns.

*Comparison of the whole Exports, American
Col*

UNITED STATES	
176 .	EXPORTS.
	7,628
	10,458
	7,324
Whole amount (a)	£ 2,852,441
1825.	Whole amount . 25,410 tons.
	10,166 men.
	4,580
	4,596
	12,161
	31,503
Whole amount (b) Dol. £ 99,535,388	Whole amount ns.
Sterling . . 22,395,463	Whole amount
Increase . . 685 per cent.	21

(a) Macpherson's Annals. Pitkin's Statistics. (b) In 1823 their tonnage was 930,501. This account includes Foreign as well as that the exports and imports from England are there transposed. The account have no account of tonnage. There may have been one vessel. (f) Confirmed official accounts. We have no account of the ships built in that Colony. (g) To which we have added, for the exports of the Out-Bays, the same proportion. (i) Official returns of quantity and value for 1824. We regret that we have no returns, nor any certain information. (l) Of this Colony men is computed by their proportion in the tonnage of Nova Scotia. (n) Year are only to October. (o) Official returns for 1824. (p) We have

(No. VII.)

*Comparison of the whole Exports, and the whole Tonnage in foreign Trade cleared
Colonies, respectively, in the Years 1769 and 1825.*

UNITED STATES.		
EXPORTS.	TONNAGE.	
1769.		1769.
		(d) Canada. Articles Shipping built
		(d) Newfoundland. A Shipping built
		(d) Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward's I Shipping built
		(e) Hudson's Bay . .
Whole amount (a) £2,852,441	Whole amount (a) 351,664 tons.	Whole amount
1825.		1825.
		(f) Canada. Articles Shipping built
		(g) Newfoundland. A Shipping built
		(h) Nova Scotia. Arti Shipping built
		(i) New Brunswick. Shipping built
		(k) Prince Edward's I Shipping built
		(p) Hudson's Bay . .
Whole amount (b) Dol. £99,535,388 Sterling . . 22,395,463	Whole amount (c) 1,114,000 tons.	Whole amount Sterling
Increase . . 685 per cent.	216 per cent.	Increase . .

(a) Macpherson's Annals. Pitkin's Statistics. (b) Authentic information. (c) Computed according to the returns of the ships cleared. (d) Abbe Raynal, *History of the Commerce of the East*, p. 100. (e) *Ibid.* p. 101. (f) *Ibid.* p. 102. (g) *Ibid.* p. 103. (h) *Ibid.* p. 104. (i) *Ibid.* p. 105. (j) *Ibid.* p. 106. (k) *Ibid.* p. 107. (l) *Ibid.* p. 108. (m) *Ibid.* p. 109. (n) *Ibid.* p. 110. (o) *Ibid.* p. 111. (p) *Ibid.* p. 112.

tonnage was 930,501. This account includes Foreign as well as American shipping. (d) Abbe Raynal, *History of the Commerce of the East*, p. 100. (e) *Ibid.* p. 101. (f) *Ibid.* p. 102. (g) *Ibid.* p. 103. (h) *Ibid.* p. 104. (i) *Ibid.* p. 105. (j) *Ibid.* p. 106. (k) *Ibid.* p. 107. (l) *Ibid.* p. 108. (m) *Ibid.* p. 109. (n) *Ibid.* p. 110. (o) *Ibid.* p. 111. (p) *Ibid.* p. 112.

imports from England are there transposed. The account of the exports to Scotland which is there wanting, of tonnage. There may have been one vessel. (f) Computed from official accounts of the quantity exported. We have no account of the ships built in that Colony. (h) Official returns of the value of the articles exported, for the exports of the Out-Bays, the same proportion, which the tonnage of the Out-Bays to Great Britain returns of quantity and value for 1824. We regret that we have no account for 1825, as the exports, shipping, we have no returns, nor any certain information. (l) Official accounts. (m) Information. The returns by their proportion in the tonnage of Nova Scotia. (n) Official returns of the Out-Bays for 1825, and of the October. (o) Official returns for 1824. (p) We have good information of the exports, but none of any

(No. VII.)

age in foreign Trade cleared, from the United States, and the British North American
in the Years 1769 and 1825.

BRITISH COLONIES.			
EXPORTS.		TONNAGE.	
1769.			
(d) Canada. Articles	£50,404	(d) Canada	7,628
Shipping built, 60 tons . . .	600	(d) Newfoundland	10,458
(d) Newfoundland. Articles . . .	150,952	(d) Nova Scotia,	} 7,324
Shipping built, 30 tons . . .	300	New Brunswick,	
(d) Nova Scotia,	} Articles . 15,435	Prince Edward's Island,	
New Brunswick,		Hudson's Bay	
Prince Edward's Isl. }			
Shipping built, 110 tons . . .	1,100		
(e) Hudson's Bay	7,087		
tons.	Whole amount £225,878	Whole amount	25,410 tons.
1825.			
(f) Canada. Articles	£965,243	(l) Canada	235,896 tons
Shipping built, 22,636 tons . . .	226,360	(m) Newfoundland	90,000
(g) Newfoundland. Articles . . .	764,677	(n) Nova Scotia	89,723
Shipping Built,		(o) New Brunswick	274,253
(h) Nova Scotia. Articles	640,220	(k) Prince Ed.'s Is.	12,161
Shipping built, 17,000 tons . . .	170,000	(p) Hudson's Bay	
(i) New Brunswick. Articles . . .	462,045	Whole amount	689,872
Shipping built, 16,488 tons . . .	164,880		31,503
(k) Prince Edward's Island. Articles			
Shipping built,			
(p) Hudson's Bay	106,640		
tons.	Whole amount currency £3,500,063		689,872 tons.
	Sterling . . £3,150,057		
	Increase . . . 1280 per cent.		2610 per cent.

ation. (c) Computed according to the proportion their tonnage usually bears to their exports. In 1823 their
ping. (d) Abbe Raynal, *Histoire Philosophique*, edition of 1772. It is to be remembered that the exports and
otland which is there wanting, is here supplied from Macpherson. (e) Macpherson. We have no account
accounts of the quantity according to the prices current. (g) Computed in like manner from official accounts.
of the value of the articles exported from the Port of Halifax for eight months of the last year. To which we
nnage of the Out-Bays to Great Britain and the West Indies bears to such tonnage of the Port. (i) Official
or 1825, as the exports, ship-building, and tonnage for that year were much greater. (k) Of this Colony
(m) Information. The returns, of 1823, give 80,532 tons, of 1821, 91,310. The number of men is computed
e Out-Bays for 1825, and of the Port of Halifax for 1824, as the returns of the Port for last year are only to
the exports, but none of any tonnage.

These Tables, it is hoped, will convey a favourable idea of the difference between Colonial and Foreign Trade, and of the increase and resources, of our Provinces in North America. The imperfection and irregularity observable in our Accounts is owing to want of information, which we have not the time, or means, to acquire. As we have reckoned the Ships built among Exports, it is necessary to remark, that most of these are intended for the English market, as remittances for goods, quite as much, as the Timber with which they are laden; and as this may not be the case with all, and it is difficult to say with how many, the fairer way appeared to be, to put down in the other side of the Account, the Shipping built in 69, though these were probably all for domestic trade; this can make little difference in the comparison, as our object is to measure, not the value of Exports, with the United States, but the relative increase. On both sides, the vessels are computed at the same price, £10. per ton, their worth, or their cost, in the Colonies, last year. In strictness, perhaps, the United States should be charged, in 69, with part of 20,000 tons, the amount built by them in that year, most of which were then merely a remittance to England, as now in the Colonies. This would considerably diminish the ratio of their increase, as their situation now must have nearly deprived them of such an export.

The year of 1825 was indeed a year of over-trading in the Colonies, as well as elsewhere; but no less so in the United States. The extraordinary rise of their cotton here, as well as other causes, made their exports for that year to exceed their imports by more than three millions, (an event perhaps unprecedented in their history,) and exceed their exports in 1822, by seven-and-twenty millions, of dollars. In 1769 the proportion of foreign produce in their exports was about 1-30th. During the last twenty years it has frequently formed a half, sometimes more, and seldom less than a third or fourth part.

The account of Tonnage cleared from the Colonies, includes Foreign Vessels, but is strictly exclusive of the coasting Trade, Fisheries, or Trade of the Lakes. The Americans calculate the average value of their freights, out and home, in foreign Trade, at 50, or even 70 dol-

lars a ton. (*Seybert*, 281.) As more vessels return to the Colonies in ballast, if we value their voyages at half that sum, or even at £5. a ton, and take the tonnage cleared last year at 700,000, (and were the returns complete it would be found no less,) the freights of that Country must have been £3,500,000.

The Map, which has been added, of the Boundary Line, is of course not intended as any evidence of our claim, but only to convey a clearer idea of the question.

THE END.

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